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I. INTRODUCTION
Contract and change are antithetical. The basic purpose of making a
contract-and the basic purpose of contract law-is to prevent change, or
at least to provide compensation for it. A simple example illustrates this
fundamental point. The reason a buyer and seller of wheat enter into a
contract is to lock in their deal. Suppose they agree that the seller will
deliver and the buyer will pay for 100,000 bushels of wheat at $2.50 per
bushel on September 1. The buyer wants to ensure that the seller will
deliver the goods and will not raise the price. Similarly, the seller wants to
ensure that someone will pay the agreed price. If either party tries to change
the deal unilaterally, the courts will force that party to pay damages to
compensate for the change. The reason for the contract, and the law that
makes it effective, is to freeze the deal to foreclose the possibility of change.
The same is true of more sophisticated contracts. Contracts, of course,
allocate risk;2 some, like those used in the securities market, do so in
2. See generally Edwin W. Patterson, The Apportionment of Business Risks
Through Legal Devices, 24 COLuM. L. REv. 335 (1924).
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dizzyingly complicated ways. Some contracts allow for limited changes,
such as the familiar output and requirements contracts. Nonetheless,
common to all of these contracts is the parties' desire to lock in their deal,
whether that deal be simple, complicated, or limited. Simply put, the other
party-be it a hedge fund or a manufacturer or anyone else--cannot be
allowed to change the contract.
The perception that contract exists to prevent change, a seemingly
obvious idea, has remained obscure. 3 Change in a global sense is inevitable,
and changes with respect to a particular deal, if not inevitable, may at least
be welcome. On first impression, it would seem that the only change
contract law seeks to prevent is unilateral change. What could be wrong
with a modification to which the contracting parties agreed?
Nevertheless, contract law is surprisingly resistant even to bilateral
changes, perhaps because of doubt about the ability to distinguish changes
that are coerced from ones that are not. At the same time, traditional
contract law has the power to accommodate change under the doctrines of
waiver and estoppel. The law has no coherent doctrine to ease the tension
between the need to lock in the bargain and the need to allow for change.
Continual practical and theoretical problems have been caused by this
difficulty.
4
This tension in contract law is drawn tighter when the contracting
parties try to add to the law's constraints against change. Sometimes parties
try not only to lock in the deal with a contract, but also to secure it further
with a written agreement prohibiting oral modification. These "no oral
modification" or "NOM" clauses are not new, but the problems they pose
have yet to be resolved. Repeated efforts at legislative resolution have
encountered several forms ofjudicial trouble. In addition, "no oral waiver"
3. Frequently the concept of contracting to protect against change is discussed in
terms of the reliance or expectations of the parties. See, e.g., Neal-Cooper Grain Co. v. Texas
Gulf Sulphur Co., 508 F.2d 283, 294 (7th Cir. 1974) ("[The buyer has a right to rely on the
party to the contract to supply him with goods regardless of what happens to the market price.
That is the purpose for which such contracts are made."). What the parties are relying on or
expecting, however, is that the deal will not be changed. The dominance of the expectancy
and reliance rubrics have perhaps left other concepts in shadow. See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH,
CHANGING YOUR MIND: THE LAW OF REGRETTED DECISIONS 41-42 (1998) [hereinafter
FARNSWORTH, CHANGING].
4. See Karl N. Llewellyn, The Karl Llewellyn Papers C.G.3, Third Contracts
Refresher Course, at 2 (not dated, but judging by surrounding documents, probably first
quarter of 1946) (unpublished collection, available at the University of Chicago D'Angelo
Law Library) ("I know few things more frequent"); 1 JAMESJ. WHrrE&ROBERT S. SUMMERS,
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-6, at 37 (4th ed., Practitioner's ed. 1995) [hereinafter I
WHITE&SUMMERS] ("immense practical significance"); Beth A. Eisler, Modification ofSales
Contracts Under the Uniform Commercial Code: Section 2-209 Reconsidered, 57 TENN. L.
REv. 401,401 (1990); Joseph H. Levie, The Interpretation ofContracts in New York Under
the Uniform Commercial Code, 10 N.Y.L.F. 350, 355 (1964).
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or "NOW" clauses have starkly divided the courts, yet the literature has
largely ignored the problem.
This Article reviews the problems caused by both private and public
attempts to regulate contractual change and proposes a solution for them.
The proposed solution for the first time makes coercion-not duress-the
test for contract modifications. The preexisting duty rule does not work, and
the duress test raises too rigorous a standard for contract modifications.
Duress requires an improper threat under which the party claiming duress
had no reasonable alternative but to accede.5 Coercion, by contrast, merely
requires a threat (not necessarily "improper") to take away a legal right, and
measures whether the victim acted reasonably (not necessarily with "no
reasonable alternative"). The coercion solution proposed here allows the
party to escape a contract modification that is unsupported by consideration
without diluting the power of the duress standard.
The legislative proposal in'this Article also accords greater respect to
the parties' role in making their own rules, through NOM and NOW clauses.
The proposal emphasizes both the needs of the parties and the institutional
requirements of the courts. Previous efforts at statutory reform have missed
their mark by failing to take account of the judiciary. The compromise
proposed in this Article reflects this lesson: legislative fiat is not necessarily
enough to change the law of contract. Just as contracts and change are
antithetical, so contract law and legislative change prove, at least in this
context, to be uneasy companions.
This Article is therefore modest about the kinds of change that a statute
can achieve. The proposed legislation attempts a realistic view of both how
the courts will apply a statute and about what has a good chance of passing
through the American Law Institute (the "Institute"), the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform States Laws (the "Conference"),
and the state legislatures. The suggested statute strikes a compromise
between flexibility, certainty, and reliance. The proposed legislation
respects the freedom of the parties and it protects against undue erosion of
the original deal, but it also recognizes the needs of the courts and the
inevitability of contractual change. Those who hope for something more
certain than what is offered here are deluded by the illusion of certainty.6
Ultimately, this Article proposes to reconceive several doctrines by
viewing them together as a group of facts and associated rules that can help
resolve, if not solve, the conundrum of accommodating change while
protecting the legal knot tied in the original deal. This Article, then,
attempts to synthesize the doctrines of modification, waiver, and estoppel,
5. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 175-176 (1981).
6. See supra note I and accompanying text.
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and in so doing, to allow contracting parties to have a hand in making the
rules by which they plan to play. 7
Part II of the Article examines traditional doctrine to gauge the
dimensions of the central problem, preventing and accommodating change.
Part III then reconceptualizes the old doctrines of modification, waiver, and
estoppel, and adapts them for more precise use. Part IV examines the
attempts of private parties to solidify the terms of contractual change by the
use of NOM and NOW clauses, with varied results under the law. Part V
proposes a partial revision of Article 1 of the Uniform Commercial Code.
The proposal would clarify the doctrines of course of performance, course
of dealing, and usage of trade, as well as modification and waiver, while
effecting a compromise between the competing contractual values of
certainty, flexibility, and reliance. Finally, Part VI explores extra-statutory
opportunities to regulate contractual change, including a two-part coercion
test that is intended to replace the preexisting duty rule and the duress
standard for contract modifications.
7. There are two particular areas I have not addressed here because they fall
outside the dialectic between contract and change. First, I do not discuss the interpretive
problems incident to the statute of frauds, and how the statute does or does not apply after the
original contract is concluded. The focus of these difficulties has been U.C.C. section 2-
209(3) and (4). Some of the scholarly writing on the issue is discussed below when it
implicates the topic under consideration here. For the most part, however, such issues are
better addressed in articles-or legislation-focused on the statute of frauds itself. This
conclusion accords with that of the study group appointed by the Permanent Editorial Board
for the U.C.C., which concluded that U.C.C. section 2-209(3) should be deleted and that any
modification should be governed by section 2-201. See PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD FOR
THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, PEB STUDY GROUP, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
ARTICLE 2: PRELIMINARY REPORT 74-75 (1990) [hereinafter STUDY GROUP REPORT]. Second,
there has been a broad range of recent criticism of the incorporation approach taken by the
Code. These arguments suggest that the place of usage of trade, course of dealing, and course
of performance should be seriously questioned. See generally, e.g., Eric A. Posner, Law,
Economics, and Inefficient Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1697 (1996) (commercial norms are
inefficient); Jody S. Kraus, Legal Design and the Evolution of Commercial Norms, 26 J.
LEGAL STUD. 377 (1997) (commercial practices lead to inefficient norms); Lisa Bernstein,
The Questionable Empirical Basis of Article 2's Incorporation Strategy: A Preliminary
Study, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 710 (1999) (questioning whether the norms assumed by the Code
exist). For a more philosophical treatment, see generally Richard Danzig, A Comment on the
Jurisprudence of the Uniform Commercial Code, 27 STAN. L. REV. 621 (1975). I
acknowledge these criticisms, but since they are focused on issues other than contractual
change, they are beyond the scope of this Article. Usage of trade and course of dealing,
therefore, are included in the legislation proposed here simply on grounds of inertia.
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II. PUBLIC ATrEMPTS TO REGULATE CHANGE
A. Traditional Iteration in the Age of the Common Law
The tension between contractual certainty and contractual change that
lies at the center of this Article has not mellowed with age. As courts have
invented and expanded doctrines to deal with the problem, some of those
devices have themselves become part of the difficulty. Perhaps the earliest
and best known statement of the issue, and the response of the common law,
recalls a fleet of seafaring cases that garnered the attention of some of the
finest minds and provoked some of the most beloved scholarship in the
discipline.
8
1. THE TROUBLE WITH SAILORS
At least since the eighteenth century, with beautiful regularity, seamen
would agree to work for a set wage and then, far from the home port, they
would demand more money. In 1791, the master of an endangered ship
promised extra wages "to induce the seamen to exert themselves." 9 Lord
Kenyon ruled against the sailors' claim for extra money. 10 In another case
a generation later, two sailors deserted a ship while it was in Russia.' 1 The
master of the ship promised the wages of the deserters to the remaining
sailors if they would sail the ship back to London, but when they returned,
the shipowner refused to pay the extra wages. 12 The sailors sued and lost
again. The same thing was happening on this side of the Atlantic. 13 In
Alaska Packers 'Ass 'n v. Domenico, seamen contracted in San Francisco to
work the salmon season in Alaska.14 Once there, they famously refused to
work without an increase in wages, and the boss had to agree. I At the end
8. See I SAMUELWILLISTON, THELAWOFCONTRACTS § 130(lsted. 1920);GRANT
GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 22-28 (1974) [hereinafter GILMORE, DEATH OF
CONTRACT]; cf Weber v. Couch, 134 Mass. 26 (1883) (Holmes, J.); De Cicco v. Schweizer,
117 N.E. 807 (N.Y. 1917) (Cardozo, J.); OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW,
lecture 9 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1963) (1881).
9. Harris v. Watson, Peake 102, 170 Eng. Rep. 94 (Nisi Prius 1791).
10. See id. at 103.
11. There are two reports of Stilk v. Myrick: 170 Eng. Rep. 1168, and 170 Eng.
Rep. 851 (Nisi Prius 1809). The latter uses the spelling "Meyrick."
12. See id. at 1168, 170 Eng. Rep. at 851.
13. See Bartlett v. Wyman, 14 Johns. 260 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1817).
14. 117 F. 99 (9th Cir. 1902).
15. This case is the classic example of what is now sometimes called a "holdup."
See, e.g., Christine Jolls, Contracts as Bilateral Commitments: A New Perspective on
Contract Modification, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 203, 208 (1997).
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of the season, the company refused to pay the extra amounts. The men sued,
and again they lost.'
6
Could the mariners of Alaska Packers have been surprised? "[N]o
... astute reasoning can change the plain fact that the party who refuses to
perform, and thereby coerces a promise from the other ...takes an
unjustifiable advantage of the necessities of the other party."17 Preventing
these coerced modifications, in the view of one modem court, is the most
important function of contract law.18 In other words, one of the principal
purposes of contract law is to prevent, or at least regulate, change.
The principal instrument of this public regulation of change has been
the preexisting duty rule. Alaska Packers demonstrates the effect of the
rule. The seamen could not win because they were already obligated to
perform precisely the duties for which they wanted more money, and the
shipowners were not obligated to pay more for services to which they were
already entitled. The bargain theory of consideration would not be
satisfied.' 9 No consideration supported the promise of extra money, and
the promise was thus unenforceable.
The salutary result in Alaska Packers would seemingly deserve
applause. The preexisting duty rule saved the case for the companies and
foiled the apparent attempt at coercion by the seamen. The rule can have
other benefits as well, in another context beset with concerns of coercion
and undue influence. Suppose an insurance adjuster approaches a victim
shortly after the accident, offering a relatively small sum in return for a
release of the victim's claim under an insurance policy. The release is
invalid for lack of consideration, as the smaller amount does not discharge
the contractual duty of the insurance company to pay according to the policy
terms. With a record like this one, then, why has the preexisting duty rule
been singled out as the "adjunct of the doctrine of consideration which has
done most to give it a bad reputation?",2 1
16. See Alaska Packers, 117 F. at 101.
17. Id. at 102 (quoting King v. Duluth, M. & N. Ry. Co., 63 N.W. 1105, 1106
(Minn. 1895)).
18. See Wisconsin Knife Works v. National Metal Crafters, 781 F.2d 1280, 1285
(7th Cir. 1986) (Posner, J.).
19. The bargain theory is encapsulated in the RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 75
(1932) and remains in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF CONTRACTS § 71 (1981). It is worth
noting that Gilmore questions whether Harris v. Watson and Stilk v. Myrick were accurately
received, through Williston, into modem contract law. See GILMORE, DEATH OF CONTRACT,
supra note 8, at 22-28 (construing WLI.ISTON, supra note 8, § 130).
20. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 73 illus. 5 (1981).
21. Edwin W. Patterson, An Apology for Consideration, 58 CoLuM. L. REv. 929,




2. A HORSE, A HAWK, OR A ROBE
The problem with the preexisting duty rule is that it leads to
underenforcement and, if that were not bad enough, to overenforcement as
22well. The rule invalidates some changes that ought to be enforced, and it
enforces some changes that ought to be invalidated. Simple examples
illustrate how badly the rule can work. Returning to the earlier example of
a sale of wheat (100,000 bushels at $2.50): The seller may discover that the
wheat will not be ready to deliver until October 1, instead of the promised
date of September 1. The buyer may not care much; a delay of a month may
mean little. Suppose, then, that in early August the buyer and seller agree
to change the delivery date, but that by September the market price has
fallen significantly. Consequently, the buyer no longer wants to buy from
the seller at the contract price of $2.50. On September 3, the buyer declares
the seller in breach, since delivery was not made on September 1, as
required by their original agreement. The buyer refuses to accept or pay for
the seller's wheat, and he buys instead on the open market. The seller is
forced to sell on the open market and incurs a substantial loss. (If we
imagine that the market price is $2 per bushel, $50,000 plus incidentals is
at stake.) Of course the seller wants to sue.
Wrong though it may seem, under the preexisting duty rule, the buyer
would win. The preexisting duty rule would invalidate the modification of
the delivery date just as it invalidated the modification of the sailors' wages.
In neither case would the parties benefiting from the modification (i.e., the
greedy sailors and the cheated seller) have given anything in exchange for
it. With no fresh consideration, the modification does not count as a
contract. True, in each case there is an agreement to the modification, but
an agreement without consideration does not make a contract. Contract law
is as hostile to these agreed changes as to unilateral changes. The
preexisting duty rule thus results in underenforcement in the sense that it
invalidates not only the coerced modification exemplified by Alaska
Packers but also the good-faith change in delivery date in the hypothetical
sale.
The preexisting duty rule also validates modifications that are
objectionable. Say the seamen in Alaska stopped work and said to the boss,
"We want our wages doubled. In return, we'll spread the word back in San
Fran that you're a great employer." The boss, with no other labor for
thousands of miles, is just as stuck as in the actual Alaska Packers case, and
he agrees to the sailors' proposal. Here, though, the seamen are offering
something in exchange for the increased wages. It may not be worth a
22. See, e.g., Wisconsin Knife, 781 F.2d at 1285-86.
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significant wage increase, but one of the chief points of consideration
doctrine is that courts, once they are satisfied that consideration exists, will
not inquire whether the consideration is adequate. 23 The parties are best
placed to determine the worth of the consideration, and if the courts were to
interfere and set prices, according to traditional logic, the market system
would crumble. The courts have made this point variously and vividly
across the centuries. The seamen need only offer a "horse, hawk, or robe,"
24
or the infamous peppercorn, or the more likely "jug[] of beer." 25 Their
modern counterparts could get away with a pine nut, the "peppercorn of
nouvelle cuisine," to immunize any modification that did not sink to the
level of duress.
26
Despite all of these drawbacks, the preexisting duty rule survived the
age of the common law. Although some courts repudiated the rule,27 and
other courts found ways to get around it on appealing facts, 28 the rule has
survived sufficiently intact to come forward into the Restatements.
B. Reiteration in the Age of the Restatements
29
Of course, one may well question whether the common law, even at the
height of its rigidity and formalism, would consistently have held a
peppercorn to be valid consideration. Now, with the refinement added by
the Restatements, there is little doubt the courts would see through such a
sham.30 To constitute consideration under the bargain theory adopted by
the Restatements, something must be "sought" by the party receiving it in
23. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 79(b) (1981).
24. Pinnel's Case, 5 Co. Rep. 117a, 117b, 77 Eng. Rep. 237, 237 (C.P. 1602).
25. I W. SHEPPARD, GRAND ABRIDGMENT 64 (1675) ("a penny or a jug[] of beer
is as much obliging in a promise as £100.").
26. Wisconsin Knife, 781 F.2d at 1290 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
27. See Annotation, Rule that Promise by Creditor to Accept, or Acceptance of
Less than Amount Due on a Liquidated Indebtedness in Discharge of the Whole, Is Not
Binding upon Creditor as Regards Unpaid Amount, 119 A.L.R. 1123 (1939).
28. For examples of delayed-delivery cases in which the courts managed to validate
the delay, see Dellicarri v. Hirschfeld, 619 N.Y.S.2d 816 (App. Div. 1994); Jackson v.
Cobert, 612 N.Y.S.2d 330 (Civ. Ct. 1994), aftid, 637 N.Y.S.2d 613 (App. Div. 1995).
29. See generally Robert A. Hillman, Contract Modification Under the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 680 (1982) [hereinafter Hillman, Restatement],
for another discussion and critique of the approach in the Second Restatement. For the
influence of the Restatements on the law, see generally Gregory E. Maggs, Ipse Dixit: The
Restatement (Second) of Contracts and the Modern Development of Contract Law, 66 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 508 (1998); for the preexisting duty rule in particular, see id. at 508-09, 533.
30. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFCONTRACTS § 71 cmt. b (1981); RESTATEMENT
OF CONTRACTS § 20 (1932).
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exchange for his own promise or performance. 31 No one really seeks a
peppercorn, and courts have no trouble penetrating the pretense. 32 This rule,
however, probably represents no change from the common law, as the rule
simply emphasizes that courts will ask whether consideration is entirely
lacking. The rule does not mean courts will inquire whether the
consideration is adequate, 33 once they have determined that there is some
consideration to support the deal. The Restatements, then, do not provide
much of a patch for this hole in the preexisting duty rule-a rule that both
Restatements carefully, if reluctantly, preserve.
34
Take the last hypothetical twist on Alaska Packers. Under the bargain
theory, the company, represented by the boss in Alaska, must have been
induced in part by the promise of the advertising. But as long as the
consideration is actually given, and as long as it is not merely nominal (such
as a peppercorn, or a dollar, or a pine nut), the court judging the
modification would not question whether the boss really cared about the
advertising. "[T]he law is concerned with the external manifestation rather
than the undisclosed mental state: it is enough that one party manifests an
intention to induce the other's response and to be induced by it and that the
other responds in accordance with the inducement." 35 The seamen showed
an intent to induce the wage increase by offering the advertising, and the
boss responded accordingly. The modification would be valid, so far as can
be discovered from the consideration rules. Such a result, however, would
justly be disparaged as a wooden application of the rules. As the reader will
see shortly, the courts have fashioned creative solutions instead of
contenting themselves with mechanistic results.
The Second Restatement aims instead to fix the other problem with the
preexisting duty rule: its habit of invalidating modifications that the law
ought to honor. The illustrative case for the new rule is Watkins & Son, Inc.
31. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 71(l)-(2), 71 cmt. b, 75 (1981).
Perhaps the nub is this text: "A performance or return promise is bargained for if it is sought
by the promisor in exchange for his promise and is given by the promisee in exchange for that
promise." Id. § 71(2).
32. See id. § 71 cmt. b ("a mere pretense of bargain does not suffice, as where there
is a false recital of consideration or where the purported consideration is merely nominal.");
id. § 79 cmt. d. For a classic and respectably aged example of a court seeing through such
pretense, see Schnell v. Nell, 17 Ind. 29 (1861).
33. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 79 (1981).
34. See id. § 73 ("Performance of a legal duty owed to a promisor which is neither
doubtful nor the subject of honest dispute is not consideration ...."); see also id. §§ 74, 76,
84. The current Restatement continues to emphasize pretense. Section 73 qualifies by
providing that "a similar performance is consideration if it differs from what was required by
the duty in a way which reflects more than a pretense of bargain."
35. Id. § 71 cmt. b; see also id. § 23.
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v. Carrig.36 A contractor agrees in writing to dig a basement.37 To the
surprise of both the contractor and the owner, the Site rests largely on rock.
38
They agree orally to change the price to about nine times the original
amount. 39 The preexisting duty rule would have nullified the modification
in a flash,40 but the Second Restatement preserves the modification by
making it binding without consideration.4 1  This exception to the
requirement of consideration has come in handy as cases like Watkins v.
Carrig have continued to arise,4 2 sometimes with peculiarly modem facts.43
The common law before the Restatements had not been helpless in such
situations, but courts had been forced to resort to subterfuge. Several
devices are prominent. One of them, waiver, will be addressed in a separate
section.44 Others are aptly evidenced by Schwartzreich v. Bauman-Basch,
Inc., which cites a number of cases before concluding that the preexisting
contract was rescinded and the parties simultaneously entered into a new
agreement. 45 In support of this holding, the court noted that cases have been
willing to assume "the new contract is evidence of rescission of the old one
and it is the same as if no previous contract had been made."46 The court
also demonstrated, perhaps unwittingly, how confused the law had become
by the 1920s. In addition to citing a case using the unanticipated
circumstances test eventually incorporated in the SecondRestatement,4 7 the
court cited some cases that employed the preexisting duty rule and
invalidated the contract, 48 and cited others that found fresh consideration in
"any new privilege or advantage to the promisee, ' 49 including the right "to
36. 21 A.2d 591 (N.H. 1941).
37. See id. at 591.
38. See id.
39. See id.
40. See id. at 592.
41. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 89(a) ("[p]romise modifying a
duty under a contract not fully performed on either side is binding (a) if the modification is
fair and equitable in view of circumstances not anticipated by the parties when the contract
was made.") & illus. 1 (1981). There is no counterpart in the First Restatement. See id.
Reporter's Note ("This section is new.").
42. See, e.g., Angel v. Murray, 322 A.2d 630, 634 (R.I. 1974).
43. See, e.g., Brian Constr. & Dev. Co. v. Brighenti, 405 A.2d 72,73 (Conn. 1978)
(involving buried waste instead of the old solid rock).
44. See infra Part III.A.
45. 131 N.E. 887, 889-90 (N.Y. 1921).
46. Id. at 890 (citations omitted).
47. See id. (citing King v. Duluth, M. & N. Ry. Co., 63 N.W. 1105 (Minn. 1895)).
48. See id. (citing Carpenter v. Taylor, 58 N.E. 53 (N.Y. 1900); Price v. Press
Publ'g Co., 103 N.Y.S. 296 (App. Div. 1907); Davis & Co. v. Morgan, 43 S.E. 732 (Ga.
1903); Alaska Packers' Ass'n v. Domenico, 117 F. 99 (9th Cir. 1902); Conover v. Stiliwell,
34 N.J.L. 54, 57 (1869); Erny v. Sauer, 83 A. 205 (Pa. 1912)).
49. Id. at 889-90 (citing Triangle Waist Co., v. Todd, 119 N.E. 85 (N.Y. 1918)).
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secure performance in place of an action for damages for not performing."
50
The last technique, in which a court takes a magnifying glass to the
underlying facts in order to find some fresh consideration, will be addressed
shortly, but the method used by Schwartzreich was perhaps the favorite.
The logic of Schwartzreich eliminates the consideration difficulty
entirely. As long as the contract was still at least partially executory on both
sides, that is, as long as each party still had something to do under the
original contract, there would be consideration for the agreement of
rescission. Each party would agree to discharge the other in exchange for
being discharged itself. Then the parties would enter a new contract, which
would be supported by consideration too-just somewhat different
consideration from the first contract. Thus a court bothered by the wheat
case would find that the buyer and seller agreed to discharge each other
from their respective duties to deliver wheat and to pay for it on a certain
day. Then the court would find that they entered a new contract, which
would be supported by consideration just like the first one, but with a
delivery date of October 1 instead of September 1. In this way the court
could reach an equitable result, despite the preexisting duty rule.
There are only a couple of problems with the rescission device: It has
virtually no basis in reality, and it applies just as logically to a coerced
modification as to an innocent one.5 1 The first problem is that in fact the
parties did not agree to rescind the old contract and create a new one. The
law is no stranger to fiction, however; fiction is one of the outlets through
which law has grown.5 2 The second, more serious problem is that the same
device that would validate the change of delivery in the wheat hypothetical
would also validate the modification in Alaska Packers, even without the
promise of the advertising. That is, a court faced with a modification issue
has two accepted and precedented devices: One that would invalidate the
modification (the traditional preexisting duty rule) and one that would
validate it (the rescission device). A judge could decide either way,
depending on which side he thought should win.
50. Id. at 890 (citing Parrot v. Mexican Cent. Ry., 93 N.E. 590 (Mass. 1911)).
51. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 89 cmt. b (1981).
52. See HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW: ITS CONNECTION WITH THE EARLY
HISTORY OF SOCIETY AND ITS RELATION TO MODERN IDEAS 15 (J.M. Dent & Sons Ltd. 1960)
(1861). See generally LON L. FULLER, LEGAL FICTIONS (1967); Peter Birks, Fictions Ancient
and Modern, in THE LEGAL MIND: ESSAYS FOR TONY HONORI 83 (Peter Birks & Neil
MacCornick eds., 1986).
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Such rules, while infinitely flexible, are not much use.53 They do not
allow parties to predict the outcome of cases, since either result is equally
possible. A lawyer needing to predict an outcome would not look at the
rules but would examine the facts for clues as to the equities, none of which
are taken into account by the rules ostensibly being applied. In other words,
the rule and counterrule make the relevant facts-the facts that will
determine who wins-appear irrelevant. 54 Nor does the law supposedly
being applied identify the norms driving the decision. Such a state of affairs
means the law has failed to provide a workable analysis; it has failed to
provide a tool for plans or predictions; and it fulfills no hortatory function.
With its section 89, the Second Restatement avoids this difficulty, but
it does not solve the problem. Nor does it advance the doctrine much
beyond those cases that would dig into the facts and find consideration
somewhere, anywhere, to support an equitable modification (even if a
magnifying glass is necessary to find new consideration). Section 89 asks,
Is there something more than the parties contemplated at the time of the
agreement? A modification is binding "without consideration," 55 the
Restatement says, "if the modification is fair and equitable in view of
circumstances not anticipated by the parties .... "56 This is nearly the same
as the question asked by some of the older cases: "Is the person who wants
more money doing something beyond what the parties contemplated in the
original contract-i.e., is there something in these facts beyond the
originally agreed consideration? '57 If the parties did not anticipate that the
house was built on rock, the contractor will have to do more than the parties
contemplated when they entered their contract. Nothing is wrong with using
an old concept if it works; that is the system of the. common law. It would
appear that the old cases are merely being rationalized and characterized
53. A word on the Critical Legal Studies (CLS) movement is relevant here. CLS
scholars might see my argument as being in accord with their views. Such a conclusion may
contain some truth, because I do acknowledge that legal rules and counterrules sometimes
lead to indeterminacy. Ultimately, however, my view diverges radically from CLS. Although
some rules and judicial responses to them lead to indeterminacy, I do not conclude either (a)
that all rules are indeterminate or (b) that legal decision-making necessarily revolves solely
or even primarily around politics, power, oppression, or the like. The indeterminacy that
results from the old-fashioned preexisting duty rule leads me to propose different rules and
standards, which I believe will work better and will avoid the problem of indeterminacy.
54. See generally Burton F. Brody, Performance of a Pre-Existing Contractual
Duty as Consideration: The Actual Criteria for the Efficacy of an Agreement Altering
Contractual Obligation, 52 DENV. L.J. 433 (1975).
55. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 4, topic 2 (1981).
56. Id. § 89(a).
57. For a more sympathetic discussion of the changed circumstances test of the
Second Restatement, see Jason Scott Johnston, Default Rules/Mandatory Principles: A Game
Theoretic Analysis of Good Faith and the Contract Modification Problem, 3 S. CAL.
INTERDISC. L.J. 335, 374-75, 381-83 (1993).
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into a rule based on what the parties anticipated. If the modification
involved more, then the modification stands; otherwise, it does not.
Something else is happening, though, as becomes apparent on further
reflection. First, it is not at all clear why the modification rule of section 89
has to be taken out of the consideration rubric and made an exception.
(Modification in section 89, like promissory estoppel in section 90,58 is
binding regardless of consideration.) If there is something sought in the
modification that was not contemplated at the time of formation, it will be
valid consideration and will support the modification, including an increased
price. More significantly, section 89 does not explain when courts will find
new consideration and when they will not. What the parties anticipated
does not turn out to explain the results of the cases, as the Restatement
would decide them.
In one example, a couple is engaged. After hearing the good news, the
fianc6e's father agrees with the prospective groom to pay an annuity to his
daughter. Going through with the marriage-instead of exercising the right
to suggest that the wedding be called off-is said to be consideration for the
promise of the annuity. 59 Yet the forbearance to exercise that right seems
not to have been sought in any meaningful way at the time of the contract;
indeed one would presume that there was little question the wedding would
go forward. Yet the Restatement preserves the reasoning in this Cardozo-
decided case, and the courts have followed along.
60
In another illustration, a debtor owes a creditor $100 on September 1.
By late August, the debtor's solvency is questionable, and the creditor is
nervous about bankruptcy. The creditor approaches the debtor and asks for
payment of $50 to discharge the debt, figuring something is better than
nothing. The debtor pays. The debt is discharged because paying early is
consideration for modification of the amount owed. Yet if the debtor and
the creditor agreed instead to extend the debt for another year, even at a
58. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981).
59. See id. § 73 illus. 9 (based on De Cicco v. Schweizer, 117 N.E. 807 (N.Y. 1917)
(Cardozo, J.)); cf Shadwell v. Shadwell, 142 Eng. Rep. 62 (1860). See generally
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFCONTRACTS § 73 cmt. d ("consideration can be found in the fact
that the promisee gives up his right to propose ... the rescission or modification of a
contractual duty.") and illustrations 6-12, where the supposed consideration suggested by the
drafters appears debatable in some cases and farfetched in others. I am not the only one
incredulous that the court in De Cicco managed to find consideration; a more prominent
skeptic is GILMORE, DEATH OF CONTRACT, supra note 8, at 62, 128 n. 140.
60. See United States v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 778 F.2d 810, 815 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
(Ginsburg, J.) (forbearing to repudiate an agreement serves as consideration for modification),
aff'g 623 F. Supp. 7, 11 (D.D.C. 1984) which uses the same notions that predated the First
Restatement. See also Schwartzreich v. Bauman-Basch, Inc., 131 N.E. 887, 890 (N.Y. 192 1)
(modification supported by consideration of"secur[ing] performance in place of an action for
damages for not performing.") (citation omitted).
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lower interest rate, there would still be consideration for a modification. The
debtor had the right to pay off the loan on time and stop the running of
interest (never mind that he did not have the money to do so), and giving up
that right is consideration for the modification.6 1 It seems the Restatement
can find consideration anywhere, if it wants, just like the old-fashioned
common-law courts.
Reading the comments and illustrations, one begins to gather that the
drafters had little patience with the preexisting duty rule. 62 The drafters
certainly understand the problem of coercion: "the lack of social utility in
[coerced] bargains provides what modem justification there is for the rule
that performance of a contractual duty is not consideration for a new
promise." 63 They do not seem to think much of "what modem justification
there is," however, and observe that "the rule has not been limited to cases
where there was a possibility of unfair r ressure, and it has been much
criticized as resting on scholastic logic. '
Yet the illustrations discussed in the preceding paragraphs show that
the result under the Restatement is not much different. The consideration
the drafters are able to find, in the absence of coercion, is not much less
fictional than the rescission subterfuge relied on by some of the cases, and
is nearly identical to the magnifying glass approach. Perhaps the drafters
are justified in making a scholastic response to a scholastic rule, but the
triumph of scholasticism is a victory for which only angels would dance in
celebration (undoubtedly on the head of a pin). Concededly, section 89
contains more than the vaunted "unanticipated circumstances" test. To be
enforceable under the section, modifications also must be "fair and
equitable." This is admirable, but calling such a standard a "rule of law" is
rather a stretch.65
61. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 73 illus. 6-8 (1981).
62. This is true at least with regard to preexisting contractual duties; there are, of
course, legal duties aside from contractual ones. The legal duty not to commit a crime is an
obvious example and is treated sympathetically by the drafters. See id. § 73 cmts. a-b. This
Article treats only the aspects of the preexisting duty rule that relate to preexisting contractual
duties.
63. Id. § 73 cmt. c.
64. Id.
65. See Hillman, Restatement, supra note 29, at 703; Henry Mather, Contract
Modification Under Duress, 33 S.C. L. REv. 615, 625-56 (1982) (suggesting an economic
analysis instead). The factors to be considered by a court, as suggested by the Restatement
comments, do little to elucidate what will count as "fair and equitable." Like U.C.C.
section 2-209, the Restatement comment requires "an objectively demonstrable reason for
seeking a modification .... When such a reason is present, the relative financial strength of
the parties, the formality with which the modification is made, the extent to which it is
performed or relied on and other circumstances may be relevant to show or negate imposition
or unfair surprise." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 89 cmt. b (1981). Aside from
the reliance criterion, which is an independent ground for enforcement anyway, see infra,
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C. Reiteration in the Age of Statute
66
In the best tradition of the Legal Realists, some might see the
consideration problem as a mask for a different test of contract modification.
A "civilized system of law," a Realist might argue, would enforce voluntary
modifications entered in good faith and would invalidate those resulting
from "coercion, economic duress, bad faith, and fraud. 6 7 As long as
consideration was used to explain the result, the general preexisting duty
rule would be subjected to various exceptions, 68 not all of which could hold
up even to casual logical examination. A Realist such as Llewellyn would
want to expose the underlying standard of decision-"the distinction
between good faith and bad faith agreements," in Grant Gilmore's words.
69
The U.C.C. takes just this approach.70  The approach is radical, in that
Llewellyn & Co. fired the gatekeeper:71 Consideration is no longer required.
these comments do not make judicial decision-making more predictable, except to say that
a little guy is more likely to win than a big one (under the "relative financial strength" factor).
Most litigators know that already, although they are unlikely to state it as a rule of law. See
James J. White, Promise Fulfilled and Principle Betrayed, 1988 ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 7, 7 n.2
(defendant is liable if he has a wreck with the Baptist minister in a small Iowa town, even if
the minister was negligent).
66. The phrase is borrowed from GuIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE
OF STATUTES (1982).
67. GILMORE, DEATH OF CONTRACT, supra note 8, at 76. I have here aligned
Gilmore with the Realists because I think he has followed their method here. He would
probably disclaim any voluntary association with Legal Realism, however. See id. at 3; see
also Grant Gilmore, Legal Realism: Its Cause and Cure, 70 YALE L.J. 1037 (1961).
68. See GILMORE, DEATH OF CONTRACT, supra note 8, at 76, 137 n. 191 (citing
Schwartzreich v. Bauman-Basch, Inc., 131 N.E. 887 (N.Y. 1921)).
69. Id. at 77.
70. For more extensive treatment of the U.C.C. regime and its difficulties, see
Robert A. Hillman, A Study of Uniform Commercial Code Methodology: Contract
Modification Under Article Two, 59 N.C. L. REV. 335 (1981) [hereinafter Hillman, U.C.C.];
Robert A. Hillman, Policing Contract Modifications Under the U. C. C.: Good Faith and the
Doctrine of Economic Duress, 64 IOWA L. REV. 849 (1979) [hereinafter Hillman, Policing];
see also Robert A. Hillman, Contract Modification and "Self-Help Specific Performance ":
A Reaction to Professor Narasimhan, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 62 (1989); Subha Narasimhan,
Modification: The Self-Help Specific Performance Remedy, 97 YALE L.J. 61 (1987).
71. See generally Mark B. Wessman, Should We Fire the Gatekeeper? An
Examination of the Doctrine of Consideration, 48 U. MIAMI L. REV. 45 (1993); Mark B.
Wessman, Retraining the Gatekeeper: Further Reflections on the Doctrine of Consideration,
29 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 713 (1996). Radical though it is, Llewellyn's approach was not novel.
The drafters were able to take advantage of the experience in New York, which had tried a
similar approach some years before. The New York statutes allow a signed writing to
substitute for consideration in certain circumstances. See N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW §§ 5-1103
to 5-1109 (McKinney 1989). Michigan adopted a similar statute, MICH. CoMp. LAWS § 566.1
(1996) (MICH. STAT. ANN. § 26.978(1) (Law. Co-op. 1999)). See generally Charles B.
Blackmar, Comment, Contracts-Proposals for Legislation Abrogating the Requirement of
Consideration in Whole or in Part, 46 MICH. L. REV. 58 (1948); Comment, The Present
1999:607 Law of Contract and Concept of Change
"An agreement modifying a contract within this Article needs no
consideration to be binding." 72 By legislative fiat, the preexisting duty rule
has disappeared from the law of sales, and now from the law of leases as
73well (so far as goods as concerned). Since an agreement to modify a
contract is adjunct to a preexisting economic transaction, both the
modification and the use of the law to enforce it may be presumed valid.74
The old problem persists, however: Which modifications should stand, and
which should fall? The answer cannot be found in the text of the statute.
The comments attempt to fill in the blank: "[M]odifications... must
meet the test of good faith imposed by this Act.",75 Given the intractably
vague standard of good faith,76 the comments go on to give the more
specific test of whether "a legitimate commercial reason" supports the
modification. The comments even suggest something that approaches an
evidentiary standard: "an objectively demonstrable reason for seeking a
modification."
77
It is hard to say anything definite about such a statutory regime, which
is both its virtue and its fault. One obvious point is that the test for
Statutory Law of Consideration, 47 COLuM. L. REV. 431 (1947). Only one state,
Pennsylvania, adopted the broader Uniform Written Obligations Act (1925). See 1927 Pa.
Laws 475 (codified as 33 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6 (West 1997)).
72. U.C.C. § 2-209(1) (1999).
73. See id. § 2A-208(l).
74. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 89 cmt. a (1981). For my
critique of this reasoning, see infra notes 324-26 and accompanying text.
75. U.C.C. § 2-209 cmt. 2 (1999). Careful readers noticed that the good faith
obligation imposed by section 1-203 is only an "obligation of good faith in [the] performance
or enforcement" of a contract or duty, see U.C.C. §1-203, and that a modification to a
contract is neither the performance nor the enforcement of that contract. See, e.g., Richard
E. Speidel, Contract Formation and Modification Under Revised Article 2,35 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1305, 1332 (1994) [hereinafter Speidel, Contract Formation]. The reporter for the
Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act (U.C.I.T.A.) appears to hold the same view.
See U.C.I.T.A. § 303 Reporter's n.2 (Proposed Draft, July 1999) (last visited Oct. 12, 1999)
(available at <http://www.law.upenn.edu/library/ulc/ucita/ citam99.htm>). I am unaware of
any court that has read the statute so technically.
76. Good faith is defined as "honesty in fact," U.C.C. § 1-201(19) (1999), and for
merchants good faith also requires "the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair
dealing in the trade." Id. § 2-103(l)(b).
77. Id. § 2-209 cmt. 2. The comment suggests this rule in the context of merchants,
but it could apply just as well in a transaction not involving merchants. Indeed, similar text
also appears in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 89 cmt. c (1981).
78. Even the most prominent theorist of good faith considers his test inappropriate
for contract modifications. Instead, he reverts to the idea of "freely manifested assent" and
the duress doctrine espoused by Professor Hillman. See Steven J. Burton, Good Faith
Performance of a Contract Within Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 67 IOWA L.
REv. 1, 19-20 (1981). For the general theory of good faith, see Steven J. Burton, Breach of
Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in Good Faith, 94 HARV. L. REV. 369
(1980). I argue against the duress approach, although I suggest that at least part of Professor
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enforceability of contract modifications ought to appear in the text of the
statute. A more troublesome point is whether some test aside from "good
faith" is possible. Some courts have accepted the invitation in comment 2
to look for an "objectively demonstrable reason" or a "legitimate
commercial reason" for the modification. 79 What is perhaps most striking,
though, is the lack of a viable test aside from good faith.
The stridency of this omission is more pronounced when one realizes
that there is a common name for the problem the courts are attempting to
police: "coercion." Since coerced modification is the chief concern in
allowing agreed changes to a contract, this Article proposes a coercion
standard to test the enforceability of modifications. This rule would expand
the focus of the inquiry from the party seeking the modification, who must
have a "reason" under the current formulation, to include the party agreeing
to it, who should not be coerced into agreement (regardless of the other
party's reason). The coercion test, as discussed below,8 0 will help solve the
problem of public regulation of contractual change.
III. EFFECTING CHANGE THROUGH WAIVER AND ESTOPPEL
In addressing problems of contractual change, courts have not been
confined to the doctrine of modification. Waiver and estoppel have also
proved to be useful tools. To understand how they work best, one must first
see how these terms are used and misused.
A. A Plea for Rigorous and Practical Terminology
"The term waiver is one of those words of indefinite connotation in
which our legal literature abounds; like a cloak, it covers a multitude of
sins. ' 81 Rarely has a single word been stretched to cover so much, but one
such rarity is the word "estoppel. '' 2 Courts may use such words to reach
Burton's approach is consistent with a coercion standard. See infra Part VI.C-D.
79. See, e.g., Roth Steel Prods. v. Sharon Steel Corp., 705 F.2d 134, 146 (6th Cir.
1983); T & S Brass & Bronze Works, Inc. v. Pic-Air, Inc., 790 F.2d 1098, 1105 (4th Cir.
1986); Lumber Enters., Inc. v. Hansen, 846 P.2d 1046, 1049 (Mont. 1993); American
Exploration Co. v. Columbia Gas Transmission Corp., 779 F.2d 310, 314 (6th Cir. 1985);
Weisberg v. Handy & Harman, 747 F.2d 416, 420-21 (7th Cir. 1984).
80. See infra Part VI.D.
81. Arthur L. Corbin, Conditions in the Law of Contract, 28 YALE L.J. 739, 754
(1919). Corbin cites the seminal work on waiver. See JOHN S. EwART, WAIVER DISTRIBUTED
AMONG THE DEPARTMENTS: ELECTION, ESTOPPEL, CONTRACT, RELEASE (1917).
82. What Corbin said about "waiver," Williston said about "estoppel." See
American Law Institute, Proceedings at Fourth Annual Meeting, 4 A.L.I. PROC. app. at 90-
106 (1926); see also Pound, supra note I, at vi (noting Ewart's work). Of similar effect is
FARNSWORTH, CHANGING, supra note 3, at 170. Although his aim is more philosophical, I
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fair results, but undisciplined use of the terms has led to a swamp of muddy
thinking. 83 Each word has, or at least ought to have, a different definition.
This Article, in an effort to avoid such difficulties, will attempt to define and
use "waiver" and "estoppel" precisely. The definitions proposed in this
Article recognize that the word "waiver" cannot realistically be eliminated
from legal discourse; 84 instead, the proposed definitions attempt to use
words and concepts likely to be familiar to lawyers now.
When asked to define "waiver," usually the first sentence out of a
lawyer's mouth is that it is the voluntary or intentional relinquishment of a
known right.85 This definition is misleading from the start. Not only does
it fail to distinguish other legal devices through which a known right might
be voluntarily relinquished, such as a contract, and not only does it fail to
distinguish a contractual "right" from a condition, but it also suggests that
a waiver requires more purposefulness than the courts have generally
required.86 In United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Bimco Iron & Metal
Corp., for instance, the Texas Supreme Court inferred from an insurance
adjuster's attempt to settle a claim that the insurer had waived the condition
requiring the insured to file timely proof of loss. 87 Not much imagination
is required to picture the consternation of the insurer and its adjuster when
they were first informed that attempting to settle a claim out of court would
waive the ability to assert failure of a condition as a defense to the claim.
Their surprise would likely be greater if they knew that a waiver is supposed
think the approach taken here is generally consistent with Professor Farnsworth's, except as
noted below. See generally id. at 154-73, 181-92.
83. See EWART, supra note 81, at 5 ("the word [waiver] is used indefinitely as a
cover for vague, uncertain thought... [I]t may have helped some judges do right under an
appearance of legal principle .. "); cf KARL LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION:
DECIDING APPEALS 404 (1960) [hereinafter LLEWELLYN, COMMON LAW] ("cases whose
language was muddy, though.., soundly decided."); Pound, supra note 1, at v ("[Solving
words] are but substitutes for thought. Indeed what enables them to endure is a convenient
elasticity and vagueness of outline that gives a certain play to the judicial instinct while
preserving the appearance of rigid logical deduction."); Edward L. Rubin, Toward a General
Theory of Waiver, 28 UCLA L. REv. 478, 478 (1981). See also note 53 (regarding CLS).
84. Cf EWART, supra note 81, at 14 ("Technical use of the word [waiver] as
descriptive of a legal situation is indefensible.").
85. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1580 (6th ed. 1990); cf RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OFCONTRACTS § 84 cmt. b (1981). A few cases using this definition include Van Den Broeke
v. Bellanca Aircraft Corp., 576 F.2d 582, 584 (5th Cir. 1978); Farmers Elevator Co. v.
Anderson, 552 P.2d 63, 65 (Mont. 1976); and the redoubtable Clark v. West, 86 N.E. 1, 5
(N.Y. 1908), aff'd, 95 N.E. 1125 (N.Y. 1911), cited in John E. Murray, Jr., The Modification
Mystery: Section 2-209 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 32 VILL. L. REv. 1, 33-34 n. 140
(1987).
86. See generally E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 8.5 (3d ed. 1999)
[hereinafter FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS]; Murray, supra note 85, at 33-34 n.141.
87. 464 S.W.2d 353, 357 (Tex. 1971).
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to be voluntary, or even intentional.8 8 And aside from the question of intent,
further confusion has resulted from failing to distinguish whether
consideration or reliance is present. Different effects are obtained in each
instance, and using one word for everything has hardly helped to clarify an
already problematic area.
The three definitions that follow attempt to differentiate "waiver,"
"modification," and "estoppel." These definitions do not try to jam all the
law into three single sentences, but they instead emphasize the different
kinds of conduct that lead to different legal results.
1. A "waiver" results from a unilateral act dispensing with
a contractual condition.
2. A "modification" results from an agreement to change
a preexisting contract.
3. "Estoppel" results when the conduct of one party
induces cognizable reliance by the other party so that in
justice the first party is precluded from contradicting its
earlier conduct.
Some space is needed to unpack each of these definitions. Waiver is
accomplished by the unilateral act of one party,89 without any action on the
part of the person benefiting from the waiver. Action by one of the parties
to the contract is necessary;judicial excuse of a condition, irrespective of a
party's consent or conduct, is not a waiver within the definition offered
here. A waiver does not require agreement, consideration, or reliance, thus
explaining the traditional rule that waiver is restricted to conditions that are
"procedural or technical," or at least "comparatively minor."91 A waiver
88. Indeed, the Texas Supreme Court did use the word "intentional." Id.
89. See EWART, supra note 81, at 13 (waiver is unilateral, "if it is anything"). Ewart
probably would not have allowed waiver-a unilateral act-to alter even a minor provision
of the contract, however; he would require a modification (including agreement of both
parties) or estoppel. See id. at 133-43. Thus, Ewart would not even go as far as the restrictive
definition in the Restatement. On the other hand, Rubin, supra note 83, does not focus on
the waiver of contract rights, concentrating largely on waivers in the criminal or constitutional
context. To the extent he discusses waiver in the context of contract law, he seems to see
waiver as the loss of a right, see id. at 483, because of a contract. See id. at 518-25 ("waiver"
of civil adjudication right through an arbitration clause; particular waivers must be "bargained
for"). His theory of waiver, therefore, is not particularly helpful in the context of contractual
change.
90. The exemplary case is J.N.A. Realty Corp. v. Cross Bay Chelsea, Inc., 366
N.E.2d 1313 (N.Y. 1977).
91. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 84(1) & cmt. a ("waiver of a
defense not addressed to the merits"), & cmt. d (minor conditions) (1981); FARNSWORTH,
CHANGING, supra note 3, at 156.
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cannot create duties for the waiving party or discharge the nonwaiving
party's promise.
Modification of a contract is now easily distinguished, since a
modification requires the agreement of the parties. 92 Bilateral action is
necessary, although reliance is not. And, unlike waivers, modifications
require consideration under traditional common law rules, as discussed
above. Although the consideration rules have now been changed for the sale
and lease of goods,93 modifications are themselves contracts, with all the
effects of contracts.
A modification is commonly thought to carry forward something from
the earlier contract, while a rescission or abandonment ends the earlier
contract completely. This distinction, however, does not work on either a
theoretical or a practical level. "Modification" is used here to describe an
agreed change to a contract, regardless of whether the contract is abandoned,
rescinded, discharged in whole or in part, or terminated. The goal here is to
avoid the hairsplitting of Green v. Doniger and its ilk, which escaped
statutory NOM rules by distinguishing rescissions from modifications. 94
Thus, this Article's definition of "modification" includes "contract,"
"novation," and probably "release" (if it is used to refer to an agreement).
This definition does not include the adjustments to contracts sometimes
made by courts without regard to whether the parties agreed to the
adjustment.95
Next, estoppel should be distinguished because it requires reliance.
96
It is thus bilateral like modification, but unlike waiver. Estoppel can be
distinguished from modification in that it does not.require agreement, and
it has never required consideration. Perhaps more importantly, estoppel is
uncertain, whereas a modification is a binding contract, and its requisite
elements are clear. When reliance is the argued basis for enforcement, and
that reliance does not constitute consideration, the enforceability of the
92. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-209(1) (1999). For a recent case applying the agreement
requirement, see United States Surgical Corp. v. Orris, Inc., 5 F. Supp. 2d 1201, 1206 (D.
Kan. 1998).
93. See U.C.C. §§ 2-209(1), 2A-208(1) (1999).
94. See Green v. Doniger, 90 N.E.2d 56 (N.Y. 1949); see also, e.g., Jackson v.
Cobert, 612 N.Y.S.2d 330, 331 (Civ. Ct. 1994), aff'd, 637 N.Y.S.2d 613 (Sup. 1995). See
infra Part IV.B.
95. Such adjustments are typified by Aluminum Co. ofAm. v. Essex Group, Inc.,
499 F. Supp. 53, 80 (W.D. Pa. 1980). See generally Larry A. DiMatteo, Equity's
Modification of Contract: An Analysis of the Twentieth Century's Equitable Reformation of
Contract Law, 33 NEW ENG. L. REv. 265 (1999); Robert A. Hillman, Court Adjustment of
Long-Term Contracts: An Analysis Under Modern Contract Law, 1987 DUKE L.J. 1
[hereinafter Hillman, Court Adjustment].
96. See EWART, supra note 81, at 13; FARNSWORTH, CHANGING, supra note 3, at
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statement that was relied on will be doubtful, because whether the reliance
is cognizable depends on uncertain requirements like reasonableness and
foreseeability. Consideration certainly has its problems, but it can at least
be analyzed in cold terms. By contrast, whether a supposed estoppel will
have any effect at all is probably unknowable until a court gives its opinion.
Although the definitions suggested here will help to eliminate some
confusion and obviate the need for phrases like "waiver-estoppel ' 97 or
"reliance waiver,' '98 waivers can differ in important ways depending on
whether they apply to executory parts of the contract-in other words,
depending on the extent to which the waiver is directed at the past and to
what extent at the future. These are issues that Ewart classified under the
rubric of "election," and they are treated in greater depth in the next Section.
For now, simply note that a reference to a waiver should specify whether it
applies to conditions that have already failed or to conditions that are part
of an executory part of the contract.
Some examples may help illustrate these definitions. Recall the
agreement for the sale of 100,000 bushels of wheat at $2.50 per bushel with
delivery on September 1. If the market price escalates to $4.00, the seller
may ask to change the price to $3.50. Within a long-term relationship, the
buyer may well agree. Both parties have agreed to the change; it is therefore
a "modification." Under traditional common law the modification would be
invalid for lack of consideration, but it is a modification nonetheless, at least
under the definition used here.
Suppose now that instead of a market shift, the seller's carrier delivers
the wheat a week early. The buyer's agent inspects the wheat and faxes the
seller the message that the wheat was "received in good order per our
contract." The buyer may be said to have "waived" the condition that the
wheat be delivered September 1. If the seller delivers a week late and the
buyer's agent sends the same message, the buyer may again be said to have
"waived" the condition of September 1 delivery.
There are important distinctions in the last two situations, however.
First, the waiver of the early delivery may well ripen into an estoppel if the
seller relies on it. For instance, the seller may receive the fax and be
surprised to learn that the carrier delivered early. Although the seller may
have been able to have the carrier hold the goods until September 1, the
seller may well decide not to take up the matter with the carrier in light of
97. See Eisler, supra note 4, at 434; see also 1 WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 4,
§1-6, at 41.
98. See STuDY GRouP REPORT, supra note 7, at 76 n.48 ("there are two basic types
ofwaiver, 'election' waiver and 'reliance' waiver."); Speidel, Contract Formation, supra note
75, at 1333 ("because of what might be called a 'reliance' waiver[, i]n effect, the buyer is
estopped . . ").
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the accepting fax.99 The buyer's initial, unilateral waiver might become an
estoppel, the bilateral requirement being met by the seller's reliance on the
buyer's conduct. Since estoppel is based on factors like reasonableness and
equity, only a court can settle the question with certainty. One may be
certain that there is not a modification, however; even though both parties
have taken action, there is no manifestation of assent from both parties, and
therefore, no agreement.
The other difference in the early and late delivery situations arises
because modification, waiver, and estoppel differ in their permanence. A
modification is as permanent as any other contract. An estoppel may be too,
if a court applies the doctrine, but that question is less certain. A waiver, on
the other hand, could conceivably be retracted. In this sense, a waiver could
be ephemeral. The next Section discusses this aspect of waiver, for it
affects how one thinks about changing contracts, and the possibility of
changing them back.
B. Changing Changes
What happens if one or both parties take some step to change the
contract but then think better of it?1  The issue this Section addresses is
not so much whether the contract can accommodate further change, but
whether a change, once accomplished, can be undone. The issue is most
familiar in the context of waiver. In particular, can a waiver be retracted?
1. RETRACTION AND THE PROBLEM OF ELECTION
Authorities have differed over whether a waiver may be retracted, and
if so, under what circumstances. A fair amount of older case law held that
a waiver, once made, was permanent.' 0 ' Law students today are still likely
to learn about waiver from Clark v. West, which states bluntly that a waiver
"can never be revoked."'1 2 Under this older rule, the effect of a waiver
differs little from the effect of a modification. In some ways, this is not
surprising, as the term "waiver" has at times included what is today called
a "modification." Using the definitions proposed here, however, a waiver
would be a unilateral act, not a bilateral one; there could be no agreement,
and no consideration.
99. See U.C.C. § 2-606(1)(a) (1999).
100. See generally FARNSWORTH, CHANGING, supra note 3.
101. See, e.g., Clark v. West, 86 N.E. 1,5 (N.Y. 1908), aff'd, 95 N.E. 1125(1911).




Under these circumstances, a waiver ought to be retractable. The
modem rules state as much, both in the U.C.C. and in the Second
Restatement, insofar as the waiver applies to an executory part of the
contract. 10 3 An exception is provided in the case of reliance, however. If
"the retraction would be unjust in view of a material change of position in
reliance on the waiver," 104 then the court is charged simply to settle the
matter justly. With considerably more verbiage, the Second Restatement
states the same exception. 0 5 Notably, however, the lack of retractability is
based on reliance, and thus estoppel as opposed to waiver, under the
definitions above.
The injustice standard is obviously mushy, although perhaps it is the
most realistic way to predict what a court will do, and thus the most accurate
possible statement of the law. °6 Still, one might well question the utility of
a standard as broad as "be[ing] unjust."'1 7  And aside from its
indeterminacy, the subsection does not even purport to answer some basic
questions regarding retraction. What if the waiver does not affect an
executory portion of the contract?
This question highlights the importance of timing. A return to the
wheat sale example will illustrate. Weather is bad at harvest time, and faced
with possible delay, the buyer faxes a message to the seller: "We still want
it, but we don't need the wheat till the end of the month. We'll take it then
and won't hold this against you." The seller has not yet delivered, and until
the seller changes position in reliance on the waiver, the buyer may retract
the waiver. This result seems unobjectionable enough.
Now suppose instead that the wheat contract calls for delivery in
installments. The seller delivers the first installment a month late. The
buyer's purchasing agent says to the seller, "Don't worry, we're taking the
wheat anyway, and you should go ahead with the next installments. We
won't hold this against you." A little later, before the seller has changed its
position, the buyer's CEO finds out what happened. Deciding that the delay
substantially impairs the value of the whole contract to his company, 108 the
CEO contacts the seller and cancels the order for remaining installments.
Seller responds, "You can't do that. You waived it." Later, the seller's
lawyer argues that the waiver affects only an executed part of the
contract-the first delivery-and the waiver cannot be retracted. The
103. See U.C.C. § 2-209(5) (1999); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 84(2) (1981).
104. U.C.C. § 2-209(5) (1999).
105. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 84(2) (198 1).
106. See KARL LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 3 (1960).
107. See U.C.C. § 2-209(5) (1999).
108. See id. § 2-612(3).
Law of Contract and Concept of Change
statute allows only retraction of waivers affecting an executory portion of
the contract, and this waiver cannot be retracted.
This situation, in more traditional terms, involves an "election." The
buyer, after seller's material breach, had two alternative, inconsistent
choices: Do nothing, in which event the contract would continue in force,1
0 9
or cancel it, thus ending the contract. 1 0 Since the buyer cannot both end the
contract and leave it in place, it must make an "election" between the two
choices. Put another way, a court may characterize the buyer's conduct as
a "waiver" of the condition that the seller perform on time. A waiver as to
a past event, however, is different from a waiver that applies to executory
parts of the contract. 111 The question remains: Under what circumstances
should a court recognize a change in a contract?
Under traditional election doctrine, an election is not retractable. A
traditionalist argued that in their original contract the parties "so agreed. If
they have not also agreed that the elector may undo what he has done, he has
no power to vary or reverse it."112 This rule is unrealistic, however. Except
in a rare case, the parties' bargain will not have addressed the effect of
elections; nor will the agreement have answered the question of
retractability. Indeed, the unexpected and harsh consequences of the
election doctrine have led to its discredit and rejection," 3 and perhaps has
led to the prevalence of NOW clauses, as well as clauses providing for
cumulation of remedies.
There are several alternative solutions to this problem of contractual
change. One possibility is to follow the approach of established election
law, which arguably is preserved by the current version of U.C.C. section
2-209(5) and section 84 of the Second Restatement: waivers are irrevocable
if they apply to conditions that have failed and can no longer be
corrected."4 Under this approach, the buyer in the late delivery case would
be out of luck. Another possibility is to allow NOW clauses to require such
waivers in writing, and the legislation proposed in this Article takes this
109. See EWART, supra note 81, at 25.
110. See U.C.C. § 2-106(4) (1999).
111. Some commentators try to be more specific with such terms as "election
waiver," FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS, supra note 86, § 8.5, at 543, or "waiver after breach,"
Murray, supra note 85, at 42. Because of its negative connotations, this Article has avoided
"election" terminology and uses "waiver," following the persistent usage of courts.
112. EWART, supra note 81, at 75; see also id. at 100-05. For a more recent and
more philosophical defense, see FARNSWORTH, CHANGING, supra note 3, at 183-86.
113. See U.C.C. § 2-703 cmt.1 (1999); FARNSWORTH, CHANGING, supra note 3, at
188. Although these authorities discuss election of remedies, the same criticisms may be
leveled at a traditional election, or as I have put it here, a waiver that applies to past conduct.
114. See FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS, supra note 86, § 8.5, at 543-44. For an
example, see Speidel, Contract Formation, supra note 75, at 1334.
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course. The third possibility, tempting but unsupported by authority, 115 is
to require a formality (such as the formal waiver contemplated by section 1-
107 of the current Code),'" 6 for a waiver to be held irrevocable.
The last option is most appealing because it accords best with the basic
idea of contract law. In the absence of consideration, reliance, formality, or
anything aside from a casual remark, a unilateral oral statement ought not
to have irrevocable legal consequences. Under current "election" law,
casual remarks or ill-considered conduct, such as an attempt to settle an
insurance claim, are given the force of contract.1 17  Such results are
anomalous in contract law and seem unsupportable. A formal waiver
requirement, by contrast, would serve evidentiary, cautionary, and
channeling functions. 118 Because of the lack of substantial authority, the
legislation proposed in this Article has not adopted this position. Parties can
easily include NOW clauses in their contracts, however, to gain the benefit
of such a rule, and thereby achieve the cautionary function of
consideration. 119
2. INTERPRETATION, MODIFICATION, AND HIERARCHY
Assessing the permanence of a change, or attempted change, also
depends on how the parties' words and conduct are construed. The most
basic version of this issue is whether a party's conduct should prevail over
the express terms of a contract. The problem arises under the U.C.C. in a
logical paradox reminiscent of Escher (Figure 1). The ranking of express
terms over course of performance may at first seem clear, but on closer
examination the hierarchy dissolves, just as the viewer cannot tell which of
Escher's flights is the highest. Under the Code, (1) the parties' "agreement"
consists of the express terms of the agreement, plus the parties' course of
performance, but (2) express terms prevail over course of performance; (3)
course of performance can result in waiver when it is inconsistent with the
115. Professor Farnsworth lends some support to this notion, as he advocates "a rule
requiring a formality for a discharge." FARNSWORTH, CHANGING, supra note 3, at 157.
Although a discharge is not the same, I believe that Professor Farnsworth has the same
concern in mind. I cannot claim him for authority, however, as he defends the traditional rule
with respect to election. See id. at 183-86.
116. See U.C.C. § 1-107 (1999) (written waiver or renunciation that is signed and
delivered).
117. See FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS, supra note 86, § 8.5, at 543.
118. See Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLuM. L. REv. 799, 799-801
(1941).
119. Cf Wisconsin Knife Works v. National Metal Crafters, 781 F.2d 1280, 1286
(7th Cir. 1986) (finding that because the U.C.C. drafters abolished consideration, they might
well choose to validate NOM clauses to some extent and thus allow the parties to substitute
this formality for the functions otherwise served by consideration).
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Figure 1.
M.C. Escher's "Ascending and Descending"
© Cordon Art B.V. - Baam - Holland. All rights reserved.
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express terms, and (4) a waiver displaces the express terms of the
contract. 120 The first three propositions are given by the statute. The fourth
is obvious: waiver, if it is going to have any effect at all, must at least
temporarily displace the terms that gave rise to the condition being waived.
The fourth proposition, however, is diametrically opposed to the second.
Now what?'
2 1
There are several choices, all revolving around the differing effects of
three or four legal doctrines: waiver, modification, and interpretation or
construction. 122 For example, suppose two parties agree to doX On several
occasions during the course of the contract, one party does Y and the other
party acquiesces. Thus Ybecomes established as a course of performance,
which is "relevant to determine the meaning of the agreement." 123 If X
stands for "make payments on the first of each month," and Y stands for
"pays by personal out-of-state check," the agreement will likely be taken to
mean that payment may be made by personal out-of-state check. If Y is
viewed as a consistent additional term, then the operation of section 2-208
is no trouble.' 24 If instead Y stands for "pays ten to fourteen days after the
stated due date," the choices of how to use course of performance become
starker, and worse, mutually exclusive.
120. See U.C.C. §§ 2-208, 2-209. Actually, the parties' agreement is defined to
include not only express terms and course of performance but also course of dealing and
usage of trade, see id. § 1-201(3), but the latter two are not relevant here.
121. The exposition of the problem here is simplified. For a more thorough
discussion and criticism, see Eyal Zamir, The Inverted Hierarchy of Contract Interpretation
and Supplementation, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 1710 (1997); see also David Charny, Hypothetical
Bargains: The Normative Structure of Contract Interpretation, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1815,
1856-63 (1991). The problem is not merely theoretical. Recent inconsistent cases include
Exxon Corp. v. Crosby-Mississippi Resources Ltd., 40 F.3d 1474 (5th Cir. 1995), Sethness-
Greenleaf Inc. v. Green River Corp., 65 F.3d 64 (7th Cir. 1995), Solar Motors, Inc. v. First
Nat '1 Bank, 537 N.W.2d 527 (Neb. Ct. App. 1995), affd, 545 N.W.2d 714 (Neb. 1996), and
Central Ill. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Atlas Minerals, Inc., 965 F. Supp. 1162 (C.D. III. 1997). See
generally I WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 4, § 1-6.
122. Contracts literature often attempts to distinguish interpretation from
construction. The process of interpretation is focused on ascertaining the meaning of
contracting parties' language or conduct, while construction determines the legal effect ofthat
language or conduct. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 200 & cmt. c (1981).
The distinction is sometimes straightforward. Sometimes, however, interpretation and
construction merge, especially when courts hold that the legal effect is identical to "the intent
of the parties." While this Article attempts to follow the rigorous usage, the reader must
recognize that in the present context, construction and interpretation will often yield identical
results, and any distinction therefore blurs toward oblivion.
123. U.C.C. § 2-208(1) (1999); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 202(4) (1981).
124. Cf. U.C.C. § 2-202 (1999).
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One possibility is to hold that the agreement permits variation in the
time of payment by a couple of weeks or so. An analogy may help
demonstrate the appeal of this argument. A court could be expected to hold
that an agreement between two rug merchants providing for the sale of
"handmade, all-wool Persian rugs measuring 9' X 12"' permits the rugs to
measure, say, 8 feet 8 inches by 11 feet 9 inches. As a matter of fact, "9' X
12"' means "9 feet by 12 feet, give or take a few inches." A court might so
hold as a matter of usage of trade, but course of performance would do just
as well. 125 The hypothetical case involving Xand Y, a debtor might argue,
is the same. Using the course of performance to determine what the
agreement means is precisely what the statutory text requires. It is no
different than interpreting a cannery contract for 10,000 one-quart cans of
oil at a dollar apiece to permit a delivery of 8518 cans or 10,124 cans, where
the trade usage allows quantity variations of ten or twenty percent. 1
26
Another possibility is to hold that construing Xand Yas consistent with
each other is unreasonable, so that X, which is an express term, prevails over
Y, which is implied by course of performance. In the hypothetical, then, the
debtor who regularly pays a week or two late would be in breach, and the
creditor in all likelihood would be entitled to take remedial action.
With more facts, however, this construction becomes problematic. If
the creditor has accepted ten late payments in a row without objection, the
debtor may be lulled into a belief that paying within a couple of weeks of the
due date is fine. After all, such an interpretation is regularly given to bills
that say they are "due upon receipt." A court, therefore, may sympathize
with a debtor who is outraged when his car is repossessed after the tenth late
payment when the creditor has never objected to late payments.127 Under
section 2-208(2), however, a court must either decide for the repossessing
creditor (ifXand Yare not reasonably consistent with each other), or allow
the debtor to pay two weeks late for the duration of the agreement (ifXand
Y are reasonably consistent), since the meaning of the agreement is really
"pay within two weeks of the first of the month."
The court gains more flexibility under section 2-208(3), which allows
two more possible holdings. A "course of performance shall be relevant to
show a waiver or modification of any term inconsistent with such course of
performance." IfXand Yare inconsistent, then instead of allowing Xas an
express term to trump Y, the court may find that Yconstitutes a modification.
125. Seeid. §§ 1-205(1),2-208(1). The reader should realize that handmade oriental
rugs are rarely, if ever, a precise number of feet in measurement.
126. See id. § 2-207 cmt. 4.
127. See, e.g., Tillquist v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 714 F. Supp. 607, 617 (D. Conn.




If both parties' conduct indicates agreement that the contract calls for Y
rather than X, then there has been a modification.128 In that case, the result
is much the same as when course of performance is used for interpretation
and construction: The contract calls for Y, either from the beginning under
an interpretation or construction theory, or by subsequent agreement under
a modification theory. The debtor will be allowed for the duration of the
contract to pay within two weeks of the first of the month.
On the other hand, if the court chooses waiver rather than modification,
the waiver can be retracted, as long as it affects executory parts of the
contract and reliance does not present a problem. Understandably, the
comments encourage a finding of waiver "[w]here it is difficult to determine
whether a particular act merely sheds light on the meaning of the agreement
or represents a waiver."' 129 The comment should go further and express a
preference for waiver over modification as well as the preference for waiver
over interpretation.
To return to the hypothetical: The creditor must do something to retract
the waiver, so it must inform the debtor that late payments will no longer be
acceptable. As to the future payments, the debtor will have to pay on time,
since they are an executory part of the contract, and the debtor cannot yet
have any reliance interest. Where the creditor has done nothing to inform
the debtor who has made ten late payments without objection, the debtor
may justly be said to have relied on the course of performance, that is, on the
waiver. But where the debtor has been informed that such conduct will not
be permitted in the future, he cannot reasonably rely.'
30
Professor Bernstein has identified a related problem with the U.C.C.
approach. She points out that there is a difference between what parties
want during an ongoing relationship and what they want during a litigated
fight. 3 1  While there is hope for future dealings, the parties may
accommodate each other, in all likelihood without ever making, or at least
intending, any change to the contract. In court, the last thing they want is for
accommodations made during the relationship to be held against them. This,
128. See U.C.C. § 2-209(1) (1999).
129. Id. § 2-208 cmt. 3.
130. See, e.g., Alden v. Presley, 637 S.W.2d 862 (Tenn. 1982) (reliance, to be legally
cognizable, must be reasonable). Cognizable reliance is unlikely, although it is possible to
conceive of such a situation: Say the debtor, after the course of late payments was established,
entered another contract which meant that he did not have much cash at the beginning of the
month but had plenty in the middle of the month. Such situations ought to arise, at most,
rarely, and under the proposed legislation courts are accorded the flexibility to deal with such
problems.
131. She thus distinguishes "relationship-preserving norms" from"end-game norms."
Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code's Search for
Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765, 1796 (1996) [hereinafter Bernstein,
Merchant Law].
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the parties might argue, is quite unfair; they are being penalized for being
accommodating. Put in economic terms, as Professor Bernstein does, too
exalted a role for course of performance results in disincentives to utility-
enhancing adjustments in the ongoing relationship. Put more simply, a party
may not want to be legally bound to be nice the next time."' Given that
desire, the U.C.C. rule that makes course of performance binding
discourages parties from making adjustments. Rigidity, instead of the
desired flexibility, results.133 Patterson suggests another scenario that raises
similar concerns: a "nervy and persistent contract-breaker, who, as against
a less aggressive opponent, tries to bull his way through a course of conduct
which does not always satisfy the explicit terms of the contract."
134
A waiver approach can help solve this problem. If the course of
performance is a waiver, it can be retracted (assuming the opposing party
has not relied in a way that would give rise to an estoppel), at least for
executory portions of the contract, and if the approach of this Article is
followed, for executed portions as well. The opposing party, of course, will
argue that the course of performance should be taken as evidence that the
contract has been modified, or should be used to interpret the agreement.
The comments of the U.C.C. anticipate these arguments by expressing a
preference for waiver over interpretation.1 35 The same reasoning, which
"preserve[s] the flexible nature of commercial contracts" while maintaining
the traditional contractual stance in favor of the original deal, mandates a
similar preference for waiver over modification.
A final point is especially relevant to Professor Bernstein's focus.
Parties, and especially merchants, are often able to opt out of the usual legal
system-and its supposedly immutable legal rules-by choosing
arbitration. 136 Merchant arbitrators who sell wheat or deal in diamonds will
132. See id. at 1807-15; see also Omri Ben-Shahar, The Tentative Case Against
Flexibility in Commercial Law, 66 U. CI. L. REV. 781 (1999) (agreeing with Bernstein's
conclusion, but for different reasons). An analogy to another branch of the law is instructive:
To encourage amicable settlements and remedial measures, the rules of evidence limit the
admissibility of such matters. See FED. R. EviD. 408-410. To encourage certain kinds of
activities (engaging in settlement talks, taking remedial measures), the law wisely limits the
legal consequences of those activities.
133. Professor Bernstein's cogent exposition of this problem captures well, for me,
the foundational flaw in the relational theory of contractual change. For discussions of
relational contract theory in this context, see Richard E. Speidel, Article 2 and Relational
Sales Contracts, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 789, 793-94, 804 (1993), and Hillman, Court
Adjustment, supra note 95.
134. 1 NEW YORK LAW REVISION COMM'N, STUDY OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE 637 (1955) [hereinafter NEW YORK STUDY].
135. See U.C.C. § 2-208 cmt. 3 (1999). Compare Professor Eisler's structural
argument in response to Patterson in Eisler, supra note 4, at 409 n.57.
136. See Lisa Bernstein, Opting out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual
Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992) [hereinafter Bernstein,
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decide cases based on criteria other than the U.C.C., whether the criteria be
religious law, trade usages, or just guts. Those who leave their disputes to
the courts should expect to have the concerns of the larger world taken into
account. The law does so when it takes seriously the parties' own conduct
and when it recognizes certain kinds of reliance as worthy of protection.
Parties who wish to avoid these norms can choose arbitration.
It must be admitted that the law has not made its concerns or even its
doctrine very clear so far. At least the abolition of the preexisting duty rule
with respect to sales and leases shows a willingness to improve the situation.
The "good faith" solution of the U.C.C. is another step in that direction, and
the good faith standard should be considerably hardened by the two-part
coercion test offered below. The analysis of contractual change should be
further clarified by the above definitions of modification, waiver, and
estoppel. Clarity about those doctrines allows a sensible ranking of express
terms and course of performance, helping courts to see what is part of the
original contract, what is a change in the contract, and how those changes
should be treated.
IV. PRIVATE ATTEMPTS TO REGULATE CHANGE
The confusion of public attempts to regulate change has led contracting
parties to fashion their own rules to govern adjustments. Perhaps the most
typical provision of this sort has been dubbed a "no oral modification"
(NOM) clause. Clauses purporting to invalidate oral waivers have now
become common, but they have not yet received much scholarly attention.
This Article labels them "NOW clauses." After discussing the problem with
NOM clauses, this Section will explain how NOW clauses complicate the
picture.
A. An Acetylene Torch
A typical lawyer-drafted contract includes a clause that says something
like, "This agreement cannot be modified except in a writing signed by the
party to be charged," or "No purported modification to this agreement shall
be binding upon Xunless such modification shall be evidenced by a writing
signed by X" Parties have been including such provisions in their
agreements for well over a century. In Bartlett v. Stanchfield, Holmes
himself held that the NOM clause had no effect. 137 It might as well have
been left out of the contract. "Attempts of parties to tie up by contract their
Opting Out]; see also Stephen J. Ware, Default Rules from Mandatory Rules: Privatizing
Law Through Arbitration, 83 MINN. L. REV. 703 (1999).
137. 19 N.E. 549, 550 (Mass. 1889) (Holmes, J.).
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freedom of dealing with each other are futile."' 138 Holmes's holding was
filly in accord with the common law of the time, as was Cardozo's thirty
years later with respect to NOW clauses. In the face of a "covenant that
there shall be no waiver or amendment not evidenced by a writing," he
unhesitatingly held that "[t]he prohibition of oral waiver may itself be
waived.' 39 The holding accords with the results in many other older NOW
cases. 140
A few modem lawyers, and certainly many of their clients, would be
surprised to learn that the treatment of NOM and NOW clauses under the
common law has not changed much. "The most ironclad written contract
can always be cut into by the acetylene torch of parol modification .... The
hand that pens a writing may not gag the mouths of the assenting parties."
14 1
Courts continue to so hold.142 Outside the U.C.C., at least, the common-law
rule is still going strong in some places.
This rule may seem odd, especially in contract law, which devotes
much of its energy to giving effect to parties' agreements. Indeed, some
courts seem never to have heard of such a rule, although they do
acknowledge that NOM clauses can be waived.' 43 The older cases ought
not to be dismissed too quickly, however. While some might argue that the
parties' agreement to a NOM clause ought to be given full legal effect, like
an agreement to another procedural term such as arbitration, this argument
fails to account for a crucial distinction: In the context of a NOM-clause
dispute, the parties have reached an agreement subsequent to their original
138. Id.
139. Beatty v. Guggenheim Exploration Co., 122 N.E. 378, 381 (N.Y. 1919)
(Cardozo, J.). Union Cent. Life Ins. Co. v. Whetzel, 65 N.E. 15, 17 (Ind. App. 1902), also
finds a waiver of the non-waiver clause. See also Headley v. Cavileer, 82 A. 908, 910 (N.J.
1912).
140. As much of the law of waiver developed in the insurance area, see Clark v.
West, 86 N.E. 1, 5 (N.Y. 1908), af'd, 95 N.E. 1125 (1911), so did many of the NOW cases.
See, e.g., Beebe v. Ohio Farmers' Ins. Co., 53 N.W. 818 (Mich. 1892); Smaldone v.
Insurance Co. of N. Am., 44 N.Y.S. 201 (App. Div. 1897); Copeland v. Hewett, 53 A. 36
(Me. 1902); Mix v. Royal Ins. Co., 32 A. 460 (Pa. 1895); Orient Ins. Co. v. McKnight, 64
N.E. 339 (Ill. 1902); Ross-Langford v. Mercantile Town Mut. Ins. Co., 71 S.W. 720 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1902). The principle had been established by the eighteenth century, however, in an
English case involving a lease. See EWART, supra note 81, at 287 n.4 (citing Roe v. Harrison,
2 T.R. 425 (1788)).
141. Wagner v. Graziano Constr. Co., 136 A.2d 82, 83-84 (Pa. 1957).
142. See, e.g., Autotrol Corp. v. Continental Water Sys. Corp., 918 F.2d 689 (7th
Cir. 1990) (applying Texas law); Wisconsin Knife Works v. National Metal Crafters, 781
F.2d 1280 (7th Cir. 1986) (applying Wisconsin law); Estate of Connelly v. United States,
398 F. Supp. 815 (D. N.J. 1975), aff'd, 551 F.2d 545 (3d Cir. 1977).
143. See Foster Wheeler Enviresponse, Inc. v. Franklin County Convention Facilities
Auth., 678 N.E.2d 519, 525, 528 (Ohio 1997). One prominent scholar has doubted the
viability of the common-law rule in the absence of reliance. See FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS,
supra note 86, § 7.6, at 450.
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contract. The question for the court is not whether to honor the parties'
original agreement, but rather which of their agreements should be effective.
To say that contract law should enforce the parties' agreement, therefore,
does not resolve the issue. The question is whether to enforce the first
agreement or the second.
The common-law courts addressing NOM issues chose the second.
This choice makes a fair amount of sense; the later agreement probably
reflects what the parties want better than their earlier agreement does. This
is not to say that there are no reasons to enforce the NOM clause in the
earlier agreement-those reasons will receive considerable attention
below'"-but the point for now is that the common-law NOM rule is not as
anomalous as it may at first appear.
B. Reform, Rebuffed at the Beachhead. A New York Case Study
By this point it should be obvious that contract law does not easily
accommodate changes to contracts. This Section adds a corollary: Not only
is it hard to change contracts; it is also hard to change contract law, at least
without the participation of the judiciary. The following case study
illustrates this proposition.1
4 5
The law of contract, of course, developed as common law, fashioned
by the courts as the demands of cases required. This common law created
the rule that NOM clauses are ineffective. The legislatures tried to undo the
rule, but early efforts met with surprisingly sharp resistance from the bench,
while later efforts were received with judicial ambivalence. The problem of
regulating modification, even when the parties choose their own mode of
restriction, has so far proved insusceptible to legislative solution. The story
begins in New York.
Cardozo had set the stage by forcefully adhering in Beatty v.
Guggenheim Exploration Co. to the common-law rule that NOM and NOW
clauses are "nugatory."' 146 In his words, "[w]hat is excluded by one act is
restored by another. You may put it out by the door; it is back through the
window. Whenever two men contract, no limitation self-imposed can
destroy their power to contract again." 147  In 1941, the New York
144. See infra Part V.C.3.
145. See generally Kevin M. Teeven, Development ofReform of the PreexistingDuty
Rule and Its Persistent Survival, 47 ALA. L. REV. 387 (1996) (preexisting duty rule, despite
decades of constant criticism, has and will survive); Robert A. Hillman, Contract
Modification in Iowa-Recker v. Gustafson and the Resurrection ofthe Preexisting Duty
Rule, 65 IOWA L. REv. 343 (1980).
146. 122 N.E. 378, 380-81 (N.Y. 1919) (Cardozo, J.).
147. Id. at 381 (citing Pechner v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 65 N.Y. 195 (1875); Solomon
v. Vallette, 46 N.E. 324 (N.Y. 1897); Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Norwood, 69 F. 71 (8th
Law of Contract and Concept of Change
Legislature, after study by the New York Law Revision Commission, 148
rejected this rule and adopted a statute giving effect to NOM clauses. 1
49
In an early case applying the new law, the legislature appeared to have
succeeded. Following the familiar pattern, a construction contract required
modifications to be written. 15 The plaintiff nonetheless claimed to have
done extra work under an oral modification, and it demanded an extra
payment. The court dismissed the claim under the new statute. The holding
would have been a remarkable victory for the new efficacy of NOM clauses
had the contractor suffered a loss, but there was no loss. The court found
that there was no proof of damage, and that the alleged extra work actually
was included in the original contract, and thus the original contract price.
While the court applied the NOM legislation, the legislation hardly made
any difference.
In Green v. Doniger,151 the new legislation came before the New York
Court of Appeals and promptly failed its first real test.' 52 In Green, a
traveling salesman sued to collect bonuses. Oral agreements with his
employer allowed the claimed bonuses, but written employment contracts,
each including a merger and NOM clause, did not.15 3 The salesman had
Cir. 1895); Westchester Fire Ins. Co. v. Earle, 33 Mich. 143 (1876); EWART, supra note 81,
at 286). The argument that plaintiff did nothing in reliance on the oral consent did not bother
Cardozo.
148. See NEW YORK STUDY, supra note 134, at 642 n.148 (citing REPORT,
RECOMMENDATIONS AND STUDIES OF THE LAW REviSION COMMISSION 345 (1941)).
149. See 1941 N.Y. Laws 329 (codified then at N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 33-c (1941);
amendments discussed infra).
150. See Morris Glasser & Son, Inc. v. Jonwal Constr. Co., 60 N.Y.S.2d 25 (App.
Term 1946).
151. 90 N.E.2d 56, 58 (N.Y. 1949).
152. Notably, Karl Llewellyn had predicted this result three years beforehand:
In New York you have a half-way road through that (which I still don't
think you can altogether trust) because under the influence of the Law
Revision Commission New York has provided that we can in an
agreement in writing include an effective clause which will keep the
agreement from being modified except by a signed writing. Even so the
road by way of waiver is open to the court in order to allow the unsigned
modification to stand out.
Karl N. Llewellyn, The Karl Llewellyn Papers C.G.4, Fourth Contracts Refresher Lecture, at
3 (Mar. 4, 1946) (unpublished collection, available at the University of Chicago D'Angelo
Law Library).
153. See Green v. Doniger, 90 N.E.2d 56, 58 (N.Y. 1949). The provision in
question was a combination merger-NOM-termination clause:
This constitutes the entire agreement and understanding
between us and it may be terminated by either of us at any time
upon thirty (30) days written notice to the other; and it shall not
be considered modified, altered, changed or amended in any
respect unless in writing and signed by both of us.
Id. (emphasis added by the court).
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received some bonus payments during the years in question, but not as much
as had been agreed orally. He sued and won. The court distinguished
between a modification, in which case it would have applied the newly
legislated rules, and an abandonment, or "recission."
The court held that the parties had rescinded the written contracts and
made new oral ones, perhaps even simultaneously with the rescission. This
mechanism should sound familiar; it is the same subterfuge employed by
courts that needed to circumvent the preexisting duty rule. 154  The
legislative validation ofNOM clauses, then, received no greater respect from
the bench than the infamous common-law preexisting duty rule. Three
judges dissented, 155 but there could be no further appeal.
The legislature was not ready to give up. It had amended the statute
once already, 156 but it still attempted to change the rule of Green v.
Doniger.157 The solution was not easy, for it is no simple matter to restrain
a court. The statute is reproduced here primarily to show that even a page
of statutory netting is not enough to hold a strong court that is inclined to
escape. 158 The statute does seem to have closed down the rescission-then-
154. See supra notes 45-50 and accompanying text. Of course, not all courts would
succumb to this distinction. For a relatively recent example, see Smith v. Richardson, 709
S.W.2d 529, 531-32 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (decided under U.C.C.).
The Green court must have known what it was doing, for it cited one of its precedents
from the generation before, which had forthrightly found a recission as well in order to avoid
the preexisting duty rule. See Green, 90 N.E.2d at 60 (citing Schwartzreich v. Bauman-
Basch, Inc., 131 N.E. 887, 889-90 (N.Y. 1921) ("If this which we are now holding [that
where "an existing contract is terminated by consent of both parties and a new one executed
in its place and stead, we have a different situation and the mutual promises are again a
consideration"] were not the rule, parties having once made a contract would be prevented
from changing it no matter how willing and desirous they might be to do so, unless the terms
conferred an additional benefit on the promisee.")).
155. See id. at 60-61 (Fuld, J., dissenting, joined by Desmond & Bromley, JJ.).
156. See 1944 N.Y. Laws 588.
157. See NEWYORK STUDY,supra note 134, at 642 (1955); see also 1952 N.Y. Laws
83 1. See generally Ronald M. DeKoven, Comment, Modification ofa Contract in New York:
Criteria for Enforcement, 35 U. CHI. L. REv. 173 (1967).
158. The statute now reads:
1. A written agreement or other written instrument which contains a provision
to the effect that it cannot be changed orally, cannot be changed by an executory
agreement unless such executory agreement is in writing and signed by the party
against whom enforcement of the change is sought or by his agent.
2. A written agreement or other written instrument which contains a provision
to the effect that it cannot be terminated orally, cannot be discharged by an
executory agreement unless such executory agreement is in writing and signed by
the party against whom enforcement of the discharge is sought, or by his agent,
and cannot be terminated by mutual consent unless such termination is effected
by an executed accord and satisfaction other than the substitution of one
executory contract for another, or is evidenced by a writing signed by the party
against whom it is sought to enforce the termination, or by his agent.
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new-contract path,' 59 but that is not the only device at the disposal of the
courts. It would take longer to get back to the court of appeals this time, but
a couple of lower court decisions, handed down within a few years of the
anti-Green amendment, intimated that judges would not hesitate to use
estoppel to circumvent the statute.
160
In 1977, the New York Court of Appeals approved the reasoning of the
lower courts. 16 1 In Rose v. Spa Realty Associates, developers sued to
enforce an oral agreement modifying a written agreement. 162 The sellers
invoked the NOM clause contained in the written agreement. The court had
to decide the case under the NOM legislation, as the parties did not plead the
statute of frauds. 163 The developer had obtained some of the necessary
governmental approvals, taken title to an acre of the land, and built four
houses on it, investing substantial sums.164 With that kind of reliance at
stake, the court followed the earlier decisions that had used estoppel to
3. a. A discharge or partial discharge of obligations under a written
agreement or other written instrument is a change of the agreement or instrument
for the purpose of subdivision one of this section and is not a discharge or
termination for the purpose of subdivision two, unless all executory obligations
under the agreement or instrument are discharged or terminated.
b. A discharge or termination of all executory obligations under a written
agreement or other written instrument is a discharge or termination for the
purpose of subdivision two even though accrued obligations remaining
unperformed at the date of the discharge or termination are not affected by it.
c. If a written agreement or other written instrument containing a
provision that it cannot be terminated orally also provides for termination or
discharge on notice by one or either party, both subdivision two and subdivision
four of this section apply whether or not the agreement or other instrument states
specifically that the notice must be in writing.
4. If a written agreement or other written instrument contains a provision for
termination or discharge on written notice by one or either party, the requirement
that such notice be in writing cannot be waived except by a writing signed by the
party against whom enforcement of the waiver is sought or by his agent ....
6. As used in this section the term "agreement" includes promise and
undertaking.
N.Y. GEN. OBUG. LAW § 15-301 (McKinney 1989).
159. See Bank ofN.Y. v. Kranis, 592 N.Y.S.2d 67 (App. Div. 1993); Meadow Brook
Nat'l Bank v. Feraca, 224 N.Y.S.2d 846, 849-50 (App. Div. 1962).
160. See Gray v. Met Contracting Corp., 167 N.Y.S.2d 498, 501 (App. Div. 1957);
Rosenbaum-Grinell Inc. v. Bart Schwartz Int'l Textiles, Ltd., 182 N.Y.S.2d 441,442 (App.
Div. 1958).
161. By this point, two versions of the earlier statute, one applying to real estate and
the other to personal property, had been consolidated into the General Obligations Law. N.Y.
GEN. OBU1G. LAW § 15-301 (McKinney 1989).
162. 366 N.E.2d 1279, 1281 (N.Y. 1977) (agreement stated that "'it may not be
changed or terminated orally').




defeat the NOM clause and the statute giving it effect.165 The court held that
"when a party's conduct induces another's significant and substantial
reliance on the agreement to modify, albeit oral, that party may be estopped
from disputing the modification notwithstanding the statute."' 166 New York
courts continue to estop parties from invoking NOM clauses, 167 although the
reliance giving rise to the estoppel must be incompatible with the
unmodified, written agreement.1
68
After Rose, the New York Legislature left the statute well enough
alone. The lesson is an important one. The legislature, or more to the point
of this Article, the Conference and the Institute, need to keep the courts in
mind when drafting legislation. Judges are the ones faced most immediately
with real, particularized fact-situations, and understandably the courts seek
an equitable result. The drafters have to understand the troublesome fact-
situations the courts will face, and reach a compromise whose merit will
garner judicial support. Such a statute must minimize unjust outcomes and
should sing out its fact-oriented approach to deciding which contractual
changes should be enforced. 69 To do less is to invite legislative revision
from the bench, 170 to the detriment of uniformity, reliability, and the host of
values that go with them.
165. See id. at 1283 (citing Zolar Publ'g Co. v. Doubleday & Co., Inc., 529 F.2d 663
(2d Cir. 1975); Imperator Realty Co. v. Tull, 127 N.E. 263 (N.Y. 1920); Thomson v. Poor,
42 N.E. 13 (N.Y. 1895); Gray v. Met Contracting Corp., 167 N.Y.S.2d 498 (App. Div. 1957);
The Savage Is Loose Co. v. United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc., 413 F. Supp. 555 (S.D.N.Y.
1976)).
166. Id. at 1281.
167. See, e.g., Dellicarri v. Hirschfeld, 619N.Y.S.2d 816 (App. Div. 1994); Latham
Four Partnership v. SSI Med. Servs., 581 N.Y.S.2d 891 (App. Div. 1992); Indemnity Ins. Co.
of N. Am. v. Levine, 563 N.Y.S.2d 811 (App. Div. 1990); Jackson v. Cobert, 612 N.Y.S.2d
330 (Civ. Ct. 1994), affd, 637 N.Y.S.2d 613 (App. Term. 1995); Bank of N.Y. v. Spring
Glen Assocs., 635 N.Y.S.2d 781 (App. Div. 1995). Union Chelsea Nat'l Bank v. PGA
Marketing Ltd., 561 N.Y.S.2d 174 (App. Div. 1990), may indicate a harsher judicial stance
that is more willing to enforce the NOM clause. See also Village on Canon v. Bankers Trust,
Co., 920 F. Supp. 520 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), construed in Banking Briefs, 114 BANKING L.J. 160-
61(1997).
168. See Rose, 366 N.E.2d. at 1283; Towers Charter& Marine Corp. v. Cadillac Ins.
Co., 894 F.2d 516, 522 (2d Cir. 1990); Goodridge v. Harvey Group Inc., 728 F. Supp. 275,
285 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); see also Rose, 366 N.E.2d at 1283 (part performance must be
unequivocally referable to modification); National Westminster Bank, U.S.A. v. Ross, 130
B.R. 656, 675-76 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), affid, 962 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1992); National Westminster
Bank, U.S.A. v. Vannier Group, 554 N.Y.S.2d 482, 483-84 (App. Div. 1990); Tiemey v.
Capricorn Investors, L.P., 592 N.Y.S.2d 700, 703 (App. Div. 1993).
169. See Karl N. Llewellyn, On the Good, the True, the Beautiful, in Law, 9 U. CmI.
L. REv. 224, 250 (1941); LLEWELLYN, COMMON LAW, supra note 83, at 183,246-47.
170. For an argument that a judicial power of statutory revision is good (or perhaps
unavoidable) in the age of statutes, see CALABRE SI, supra note 66, at 2-3.
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To avoid such a result, the legislation proposed below emphasizes both
the parties' "bargain in fact"'17 1 and their reliance interests. It attempts to
fashion a rule that will allow sufficient predictability for the parties and
sufficient flexibility for the courts. It takes a similar approach to waiver.
Modification and waiver-and NOM and NOW clauses- are two facets of
the single problem of contractual change. This approach takes account of
the lesson of New York and the limits on innovation by statute.
C. The U. C. C. and the Importance of Waiver
The New York experience is instructive because the legislature and the
courts of that state have had much longer to mull over the statutory approach
to the issue. Most other states used the common-law rules until they adopted
Article 2 of the U.C.C. The operative provisions of Article 2 provide that
"[a] signed agreement which excludes modification or rescission except by
a signed writing cannot be otherwise modified or rescinded," but "an attempt
at modification or rescission [that] does not satisfy [such a] requirement[ ]
... can operate as a waiver." 172 The U.C.C., then, gives some effect to
oNOM clauses, but harsh results can be tempered by construing a failed
modification as a "waiver." The tension between these two rules famously
split Judges Posner and Easterbrook in Wisconsin Knife Works v. National
Metal Crafters,173 and one of the leading writers on the problem still sees
the subject as "shrouded in mystery."'
174
The scheme of the current Code works like this: NOM clauses are
valid. An attempted modification that contravenes a NOM clause is legally
ineffective as a modification. 175 The failed attempt, however, "can" be
effective as a waiver. 176 A waiver may be retracted, but only if it pertains
171. I do not argue that this emphasis is new. Just the opposite: I have tried to be
faithful to the overarching themes of the Code. See STUDY GROUP REPORT, supra note 7, at
11; Robert A. Hillman, Standards for Revising Article 2 of the U. C. C.: The NOM Clause
Model, 35 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1509, 1511 (1994) [hereinafter, Standards]. As should be
clear from the text, the proposed legislation is offered in the spirit of the Code itself See John
L. Gedid, U. C. C. Methodology: Taking a Realistic Look at the Code, 29 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 341, 342 (1988).
172. U.C.C. § 2-209 (1999); accord id. § 2A-208.
173. 781 F.2d 1280 (7th Cir. 1986). The issue has continued to split the courts. See
Eisler, supra note 4, at 434 & nn. 232-33 (collecting cases).
174. Robert A. Hillman,Article 29(2) ofthe United Nations Convention on Contracts
for the International Sale of Goods: A New Effort at Clarifying the Legal Effect of "No Oral
Modification " Clauses, 21 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 449,449 (1988) [hereinafter Hillman, CISG].
175. See U.C.C. § 2-209(2) (1999); see also I WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 4,
§ 1-6, at 35.
176. U.C.C. § 2-209(4) (1999).
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to an executory part of the contract and only if the other party has not relied
on the waiver.
1 77
The problem is the "schizophreni[a]" reflected on the face of the
rules. 17 8 Not surprisingly, courts and commentators have struggled to
reconcile the left hand, which taketh away the modification, and the right
hand, which giveth a waiver. 179 Some cases enforce NOM clauses,180 other
cases have enforced NOM clauses outside of Article 2,181 and at least one
court simply ignored NOM clauses when faced with such rules.' 82 On the
other hand, parties have been estopped from invoking NOM clauses, 183 and
such provisions can be waived. 184
As the Seventh Circuit has held, however, the U.C.C. could not
possibly mean that the same action that is ineffective as a "modification"
becomes effective under the different label of "waiver." In Wisconsin Knife,
the court divined reliance as the ingredient necessary to transform a failed
modification into an effective waiver. 85 Wisconsin Knife was a fractured
opinion, however, and scholars have not shown much more unity on the
subject of section 2-209. Professors White and Summers find support for
177. See id. § 2-209(5).
178. See Douglas K. Newell, Cleaning Up U.C.C. Section 2-209,27 IDAHO L. REV.
487, 489 (1990).
179. See Eisler, supra note 4, at40; Hillman, UC.C., supra note 70, at 335; Levie,
supra note 4, at 355; Murray, supra note 85, at 33; Newell, supra note 178; Frank A.
Rothermel, Comment, Role of Course of Performance and Confirmatory Memoranda in
Determining the Scope, Operation and Effect of "No Oral Modification" Clauses, 48 U.
PITT. L. REv. 1239, 1239-40 (1987). The cited articles collect a number of cases, of which
Wisconsin Knife Works v. National Metal Crafters, 781 F.2d 1280 (7th Cir. 1986), is
certainly the best known. A sampling of cases might also include South Hampton Co. v.
Stinnes Corp., 733 F.2d 1108 (5th Cir. 1984), and Brookside Farms v. Mama Rizzo 's, Inc.,
873 F. Supp. 1029 (S.D. Tex. 1995).
180. SeeGreen Constr. Co. v. FirstIndem. ofAm. Ins. Co., 735 F. Supp. 1254, 1261-
62 (D. N.J. 1990); Indussa Corp. v. Reliable Stainless Steel Supply Co., 369 F. Supp. 976,
978-79 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
181. See Pavco Indus., Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank, 534 So. 2d 572, 576 (Ala. 1988)
(enforcing NOM clause in note); National Westminster Bank USA v. Vannier Group, 554
N.Y.S.2d 482, 483 (App. Div. 1990) (same); Pantano v. McGowan, 530 N.W.2d 912, 915
(Neb. 1995) (stock purchase).
182. See In re Estate of Upchurch, 466 S.W.2d 886, 889-90 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1970).
183. See Knutson Shipbuilding Corp. v. Rogers Constr. Corp., 6 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. (CBC) 323 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1969).
184. See West Point-Pepperell, Inc. v. Bradshaw, 377 F. Supp. 154 (M.D. Ala.
1974); Albany Roller Mills, Inc. v. Northern United Feeds & Seeds, Inc., 397 N.W.2d 430
(Minn. Ct. App. 1986); Linear Corp. v. Standard Hardware Co., 423 So. 2d 966 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1982); Knoxville Rod & Bearing, Inc. v. Bettis Corp., 672 S.W.2d 203 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1983); Gold Kist, Inc. v. Pillow, 582 S.W.2d 77 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1979).
185. See Wisconsin Knife, 781 F.2d at 1286-87.
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for the Wisconsin Knife majority in the statutory text, 186 while Professor
Farnsworth appears to side with the dissent.1
87
With all the divisions provoked by the U.C.C. rules regarding NOM
clauses, one might think it best that the Code ignores NOW clauses
altogether. There is no disagreement in the scholarship, which pays them
little attention. 18 The courts, however, have been required to consider such
clauses and have reached starkly divided results. Some cases have managed
to avoid the difficulty; 189 others have followed varying paths. For example,
some courts have bluntly ruled that NOW clauses are invalid' 90 and have
continued to follow the traditional rule,191 while another line of authority
gives effect to the NOW clauses just as they are written.
Tiliquist v. Ford Motor Credit Co., for example, follows the most
stringent rule on NOW clauses, but only because bound to do so, and the
rule was not allowed to detract from the result.192 (The court merely
resorted to a different theory.) The parties had presented paradigmatic facts.
The plaintiff, a man who had borrowed money to finance his car, habitually
paid late. 193 The finance company accepted the late payments for a long
time, but eventually became exasperated and repossessed the car. 194 He
claimed damages, apparently arguing that if the finance company was
suddenly going to stop accepting late payments, it should have told him
186. See I WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 4, § 1-6, at 34.
187. See FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS, supra note 86, § 7.6, at 452, although Professor
Farnsworth does not fully concur with either opinion. See Letter from E. Allan Farnsworth
to David V. Snyder 1 (Apr. 26, 1999) (on file with author). Professor Eisler finds merit in
both the majority and the dissent. See Eisler, supra note 4, at 435.
188. Eisler, supra note 4, at 418, notes: "The weight of authority gives no legal effect
to an NOM clause that prohibits waivers when the party's conduct evidences a waiver under
[§§ 2-209(4) and (5)]." Eisler cites only Battista v. Saving Bank, 507 A.2d 203,207-09 (Md.
Ct. Spec. App. 1986), which reviews opposing lines of authority and holds that a NOW clause
may be waived. On the strength of Battista, Professor Eisler argues that a contrary case,
Marlowe v. Argentine Naval Comm 'n, 808 F.2d 120 (D.C. Cir. 1986), "was wrong." Eisler,
supra note 4, at 418. White and Summers observe that NOW clauses may themselves be
waived but caution simply that "courts should be slow to find waiver of anti-waiver
provisions. When parties agree in writing that no waiver or modification shall be binding
unless in writing, the one seeking a modification should get it in writing." I WHITE &
SUMMERS, supra note 4, § 1-6, at 33.
189. See PC COM, Inc. v. Proteon, Inc., 946 F. Supp. 1125, 1133-35 (S.D.N.Y.
1996) (alternative holding).
190. See Cassidy Podell Lynch, Inc. v. SnyderGeneral Corp., 944 F.2d 1131, 1147
(3d Cir. 1991).
191. See Enserch Corp. v. Rebich, 925 S.W.2d 75, 82 (Tex. App. 1996) (citing, inter
alia, 3A ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 763 (1960)).
192. 714 F. Supp. 607 (D. Conn. 1989).
193. See id. at 608-09.
194. See id. at 609.
1999:607
WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
first. 195  Legally, the plaintiff's theory would be waiver: the finance
company had waived the condition that payments be made on time. The
company defended by asserting the NOW clause in the finance agreement,
arguing that there could be no waiver without a writing. 196
Squarely confronted with the problem of NOW clauses, the court
surveyed the different lines of authority. In the absence of a NOW clause,
the court observed, "most jurisdictions adhere to the general rule that a party
'who has accepted late payments as a matter of course, must.., give notice
to the debtor that strict compliance with the terms of the contract will be
demanded henceforth if repossession is to be avoided."",197 When the
parties' agreement includes a NOW clause, the court continued, courts split
into several camps. 19 One camp adheres to the same rule, despite the NOW
clause, on an estoppel theory. Acceptance of late payments can set up the
estoppel, preventing a creditor from repossessing without giving notice that
strict compliance will be required.199 Another line of cases reaches the same
result on a theory of waiver rather than estoppel, and the waiver can be
retracted by notice as provided by section 2-209(5). 200 Whether these first
two camps are really separate is open to some question, however, as the
reliance required for an estoppel may be presumed, and whether the
presumption can be rebutted appears doubtful in at least one jurisdiction.
20 1
The third camp, by contrast, is all the way on the other side of the
battleground. The courts in that camp enforce NOW clauses as written,
202
195. See id. at 610-11.
196. See id. at 611.
197. Tiliquist, 714 F. Supp. at 611 (citations omitted ); see also Driftwood Manor
Investors v. City Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 305 S.E.2d 204, 207 (N.C. Ct. App. 1983)
("majority" and "better-reasoned" rule require creditor who has accepted late payments to
give notice that strict compliance will be required).
198. See Tillquist, 714 F. Supp. at 611.
199. See id.; accord Kelly Tractor Co. v. R.J. Canfield Contracting, Inc., 579 So. 2d
261,264 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991); Montgomery Enters. v. Atlantic Nat'l Bank, 338 So. 2d
1078, 1080 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976); Gonsalves v. Gilbert, 356 P.2d 379,384 (Haw. 1960);
Knoxville Rod & Bearing, Inc. v. Bettis Corp., 672 S.W.2d 203, 207-08 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1983); Moe v. John Deere Co., 516 N.W.2d 332, 337 (S.D. 1994).
200. See Tillquist, 714 F. Supp. at 611-12 (construing Westinghouse Credit Corp.
v. Shelton, 645 F.2d 869, 874 (10th Cir. 1981)); accord Dillingham Commercial Co., v.
Spears, 641 P.2d 1, 7 (Alaska 1982); Woods v. Monticello Dev. Co., 656 P.2d 1324, 1327
(Colo. Ct. App. 1982); Smith v. General Fin. Corp., 255 S.E.2d 14, 15 (Ga. 1979); Battista
v. Savings Bank, 507 A.2d 203,209 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1986); Summa Corp. v. Richardson,
564 P.2d 181, 184-85 (Nev. 1977); Fisher v. Tiffin, 551 P.2d 1061, 1063 (Or. 1976); Living
Scriptures, Inc. v. Kudlik, 890 P.2d 7, 10 (Utah Ct. App. 1995).
201. See Cobb, 295 N.W.2d at 236-37.
202. See Tillquist, 714 F. Supp. at 611 (citing Virgil Van Bibber v. Norris, 419
N.E.2d 115 (Ind. 1981); Hale v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 374 So. 2d 849 (Ala. 1979); Wade
v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 455 F. Supp. 147 (D.C.E.D. Mo. 1978)); accord Williams v. Ford
Motor Credit Co., 435 So. 2d 66,68 (Ala. 1983); General Grocer Co. v. Bachar, 365 N.E.2d
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and the Tillquist court was bound to join that camp. Citing S.H. V C., Inc. v.
Roy,20 3 the district court noted that it was bound by a decision of the
Connecticut Supreme Court, despite a cogent dissent by Justice Peters.
204
In other jurisdictions, however, the result is far from predetermined. A
Maryland court, for example, conducted a similar review of authorities, and
not being bound by precedent, it chose to join the camp allowing waiver of
the NOW clause.
20 5
As explained more fully in the following Section, the legislation
proposed in this Article treats NOW clauses like NOM clauses. The parties'
agreement is thus accorded respect, but the clauses are not impregnable.
True estoppel, which requires reasonable, material, good-faith reliance,
ought to defeat the NOW clause. The proposal, therefore, joins the estoppel
camp, but requires the courts to conduct a fact-intensive inquiry into the
surrounding circumstances. While some boilerplate provisions may not
survive, parties who care about their NOW clause can make their fact
situation one in which the court will honor the clause.
V. THE FUTURE OF STATUTE: PROPOSED REVISIONS
A. The Move to Article 1
My interest in this subject was sparked by an assignment as part of the
current revision of the U.C.C. 206 The first task was to determine whether
particular provisions regulating modification, waiver, and estoppel (sections
2-208 and 2-209) ought to be moved to Article 1, and thus made applicable
to the areas governed by all of the Code. The question was prompted in the
first instance by the U.C.C. Permanent Editorial Board (PEB). 2°The PEB
noted that course of performance receives full treatment only in Article 2208
and not in the "general provisions" of Article 1, where it might be expected
1106, 1109 (111. App. Ct. 1977); McAllister v. Langford Investigators, Inc., 380 So. 2d 299,
300 (Ala. Civ. App. 1980) (following Hale only because bound to do so).
203. 450 A.2d 351 (Conn. 1982).
204. See Tiliquist, 714 F. Supp. at 612 & n.2; see also Christensen v. Cutaia, 560
A.2d 456, 459 (Conn. 1989). See generally Elizabeth C. Yen, A Pattern ofAccepting late
Payments on a Loan or Lease Does Not Necessarily Preclude the Creditor from Later
Considering the Debtor to Be in Default, 107 BANKING L.J. 355, 356-57 (1990).
205. See Battista, 507 A.2d at 207-09; see also Hoffman v. Glock, 315 A.2d 551,
554-55 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1974).
206. The entire Code has been under revision for several years. Several articles have
been revised and are now being implemented by legislatures across the country.
207. See generally PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE, COMMENTARY No. 10 (Final Draft of Feb. 10, 1994) [hereinafter PEB COMMENTARY
No. 10].
208. See U.C.C. § 2-208 (1999).
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to appear with the provisions on course of dealing and usage of trade.
20 9
The PEB could discern no plausible reason for excluding course of
performance from Article 1, 21 and the Article 2 Study Group suggested that
the current section 2-208 be moved during the revision process. Because
sections 2-208 (course of performance and waiver) and 2-209 (waiver and
modification) are so closely tied, the Article 1 Drafting Committee
wondered whether both sections should be moved to Article 1.211
The Article 1 Subcommittee reached at least a tentative conclusion that
sections 2-208 and 2-209 should be moved.212 One important reason for the
move was that each of the three drafting committees with jurisdiction over
such questions seemed to disagree with the other two committees on at least
209. See id. § 1-205. Course of performance is mentioned in the Article 1
definition of "agreement." Id. § 1-201(3).
210. See PEB COMMENTARY No. 10, supra note 207, at n.8.
211. ' See Rev. U.C.C. § 1-304 note (Revised Draft of Sept. 1999, available at
<http://www.law.upenn.edu/library/ulc/ulc.htm>) [hereinafter Rev. U.C.C.]. I set out to
answer this question with the collaboration of Margaret Moses. The task was given to the
Article I Subcommittee of the American Bar Association U.C.C. Committee. Fred Miller,
executive director of the Conference, describes these ABA subcommittees as "research arms"
for the drafting committees. At the time I received this assignment, I was a member of the
Article I Subcommittee. The chair, Sarah Howard Jenkins, has now appointed me to serve
as "recorder" for the subcommittee.
212. This occurred at the Boston Meeting of Article I Subcommittee ofthe American
Bar Association U.C.C. Committee (Apr. 3, 1997). Although some questions about opinion
practice have been raised, such concerns can easily be allayed. Even without these provisions
in Article 1, opinion letters frequently contain qualifications to the "enforceability" opinion
(i.e., the opinion that the contract in question is enforceable in accordance with its terms).
Here are sample qualifications from the form of a major Boston law firm (that wishes to
remain anonymous):
(i) enforceability of the [Agreements] may be limited by general principles of
contract law which include (a) the unenforceability of provisions to the effect that
provisions of the [Agreements] may only be amended or waived in writing... ;
(ii) the obligations, rights and remedies of the parties may be limited by...
general principles of equity ... including, without limitation, the discretion of
any court ... in granting... equitable relief.
In addition, opinion letters only speak as of their date, do not cover subsequent events that
may lead a court to find a modification or waiver, and do not include facts that have not been
disclosed to the lawyers rendering the opinion. The form language states:
As to various facts material to the opinions set forth herein, we have relied
without independent verification upon factual representations made by [our
client] in the [Transaction Documents], upon certificates of public officials and
upon facts certified to us by officers of [our client].
All of the opinions set forth herein are rendered as of the date hereof, and we
assume no obligation to update such opinions to reflect any facts or circumstances
which hereafter may come to our attention or any change in law which may
hereafter occur.
Similar points are made in TRIBAR OPINION COMMITTEE, THE COLLECTED TRIBAR LEGAL
OPINION REPORTS 1979-1998, at 15, 43, 43 n.78, 89-90 (1999).
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one substantive issue.213 The controversy among the drafters underscores
the policy choices underlying these rules and emphasizes that learned and
reasonable men and women will differ on these issues. 214 Each article of the
Code, after all, has its own drafting committee, consisting of representatives
of the Institute and Conference, as well as advisors from the American Bar
Association. 215  Each drafting committee receives input from affected
groups, and many interested parties attend and participate, to varying
degrees, in drafting committee deliberations. The drafting committees
generally meet several times each year and invest a tremendous amount of
216time and effort in the project. This investment naturally leads to the usual
consequences of becoming invested in a product, and this results, in turn, in
a potential competition between committees that have reached different
conclusions.
213. The three drafting committees were working on Article 2, governing the sale of
goods, Article 2A, governing the lease of goods, and what was then called Article 2B. The
American Law Institute did not vote to include Article 2B as part of the U.C.C., but the
Conference decided to forge ahead on its own and in July 1999 approved the erstwhile Article
2B as the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act (U.C.I.T.A.). Although it was
immediately obsolescent, Symposium, Intellectual Property and Contract Law for the
Information Age: The Impact ofArticle 2B of the Uniform Commercial Code on the Future
ofInformation and Commerce, 87 CAL. L. REV. I (1999), is a useful collection of scholarship.
As this Article was going to press, the Article 2 Drafting Committee had been reconstituted
but it had not yet met and no new draft was available.
For the inconsistent treatment by different committees, including express refusal to
conform to each other, compare Rev. U.C.C. §§ 2-2 10 with 2B-303 & note ("Article 2B will
not conform") and 2A-302 note (raising issues about reliance, not mentioned in Article 2 or
2B), supra note 211. The drafts are continually changing, making them difficult to cite
definitely, but a recent mention of the inconsistency is in Memorandum from Marion
Benfield, Reporter for Article 2A, to Article 2A Drafting Committee and other interested
parties, 20 (Mar. 10, 1999) (available from the author or the Conference) ("Article 2 has
now reverted to the material change of position rule for retraction of waiver and for loss of
ability to rely on a no-modification-except-in-writing clause. Do we wish to adopt the present
article 2 version?"). U.C.I.T.A. § 303, the current equivalent of the section that had explicitly
refused to conform, no longer highlights the disparity but has not conformed. U.C.I.T.A.,
supra note 75, at § 303.
214. Some may well question the institutional competence of the Conference and the
Institute to make these kinds of policy choices, but that issue is well outside the scope of this
Article. See generally, e.g., Kathleen Patchel, Interest Group Politics, Federalism, and the
Uniform Laws Process. Some Lessons from the Uniform Commercial Code, 78 MINN. L.
REv. 83, 88-106 (1993). For a collection of relevant articles, a discussion of the political
criticisms, and a defense of the Code, see A. Brooke Overby, Modeling U. C. C. Drafting, 29
Loy. L.A. L. REV. 645,645 n.3, 661-64 (1996).
215. For descriptions of the lawmaking process, see Fred H. Miller, Realism Not
Idealism in Uniform Laws-Observationsfrom the Revision of the U. C C., 39 S. TEX. L. REV.
707, 712-26 (1998), which also collects a number of more critical descriptions of the process.
See id. at 708-10, 708 n.5.
216. Seeid. at 714.
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This potential has been realized, despite efforts to harmonize the
competing articles of the Code, particularly in the context of contractual
change.217 The resulting inconsistency leads to a number of pernicious
effects. For instance, different results may be obtained depending on
whether a transaction is a sale of goods, a lease of goods, or a license of
computer software. Occasionally such differences are explained by citing
differences in the affected industries. Whether such explanations justify the
different treatments is another question, but in the context of contractual
change, no one has even pointed to any particular industry practices to
explain the differences. The only explanation for the difference is that
different drafting committees reached different results in this difficult and
controversial area.
There is another, more insidious, problem with allowing different
committees to treat the same issue. The rules, to anyone but the most careful
legislature, will look the same. Legislatures are therefore unlikely to even
notice the different policy decisions that each article requires. Courts may
also be confused, mistakenly analogizing precedent from one article in the
context of another, where the legislation calls for a different result. Only
when the law becomes confused will the problem become prominent, and
such a result is far from what one might expect from bodies whose raison
d'gtre is to provide laws drafted by experts.
Aside from the danger of inconsistency, there is no reason not to have
general principles apply uniformly throughout contract and commercial law.
Courts have already applied the rules of sections 2-208 and 2-209 broadly,
and the rules in those sections may well be applied as supplemental
principles under section 1-103, 2 I1 even without a specific provision for
219 220them. Course of performance is recognized in the Second Restatement.
And while the doctrines differ in some important respects, the U.C.C.
217. See Memorandum from Boris Auerbach, Chair, Article I Drafting Committee,
to Committee ofthe Whole (July 21, 1998) (on file with author), incorporating Memorandum
from Auerbach to Gene Lebrun (Sept. 30, 1997) and another attachment, about efforts to
harmonize Articles 2, 2A, and then-2B (now U.C.I.T.A.). For a recent statement of
inconsistency, see Professor Benfield's memorandum, supra note 213. Article 1, which will
follow the revision of the other articles, has been assigned the role of coordinating and
harmonizing the other articles where appropriate.
218. See Northern Trust Co. v. Oxford Speaker Co., 440 N.E.2d 968, 971-72 (I11.
App. Ct. 1982) (law of waiver and estoppel apply to letters of credit through U.C.C. § 1-103);
Western Nat'l Bank v. Harrison, 577 P.2d 635, 638 (Wyo. 1978) (importing general law of
waiver through § 1-103 into Article 9 context); see also U.C.C. § 5-108 cmt. 3 (1999)
("substitut[ing] a strict preclusion principle for the doctrines of waiver and estoppel that
might otherwise apply under Section 1-103").
219. See National Livestock Credit Corp. v. Schultz, 653 P.2d 1243, 1246-47 (Okla.
Ct. App. 1982).
220. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 202(4) (1981).
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concept is not too far removed from its common-law predecessor, "practical
construction. '"22 1 Numerous courts have applied the rules of sections 2-208
and 2-209 throughout the different realms of contract and commercial
law.
222
The legislation proposed in this Article, therefore, assumes that the
provision will appear in Article 1 and will at least apply throughout the
subjects governed by the Code, and preferably throughout contract law in
general.
223
B. Baring Some Philosophical Premises
Relatively early in his career as a draftsman of commercial law, Grant
Gilmore identified the principal object of drafting to be accuracy, not
originality. "[D]raftsmen of general commercial legislation... attempt to
state as a matter of law the conclusion which the business community apart
from statute . . . gives to the transaction in any case." 224  Certainly
221. 1 WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 4, § 1-6, at 39 (citing CORBIN ON CONTRACTS
§ 558).
222. See Westinghouse Credit Corp. v. Shelton, 645 F.2d 869, 872-73 & n.3 (10th
Cir. 1981) (course of performance may result in waiver of term in security agreement
governed by Article 9); Driftwood Manor Investors v. City Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 305
S.E.2d 204, 207 (N.C. Ct. App. 1983) (Article 3 note holder who repeatedly accepts late
installments waives right to accelerate because of subsequent late payment unless the payor
is first notified that prompt payment will be required); Pavco Indus., Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank,
534 So. 2d 572,576 (Ala. 1988) (enforcingNOM clause in note); National Westminster Bank
USA v. Vannier Group, 554 N.Y.S.2d 482, 483 (App. Div. 1990) (same); Pantano v.
McGowan, 530 N.W.2d 912, 915 (Neb. 1995) (enforcing NOM clause in case involving
acquisition of corporation by stock purchase). Although several cases have applied waiver
and estoppel principles to letters of credit governed by Article 5, see Pro-Fab, Inc. v. Vipa,
Inc., 772 F.2d 847, 855 (1 1th Cir. 1985); Schweibish v. Pontchartrain State Bank, 389 So.
2d 731, 737 (La. Ct. App. 1980) (estoppel); Northern Trust Co. v. Oxford Speaker Co., 440
N.E.2d 968,971-72 (111. App. Ct. 1982) (law of waiver and estoppel apply to letters of credit
through U.C.C. § 1-103), the revisers of Article 5 disapprove of such decisions. See U.C.C.
§ 5-108 cmt. 7 (1995) (citing Schweibish and Titanium Metals Corp. v. Space Metals, Inc.,
529 P.2d 431 (Utah 1974)). They would opt instead for a rule of strict preclusion and the
nearly incredible formalism of Courtaulds of N. Am., Inc. v. North Carolina Nat 'lBank, 528
F.2d 802, 804-05 (4th Cir. 1975), rev'g 387 F. Supp. 92 (M.D.N.C. 1975). If such a result
is to be preserved, Article 5 may have to be exempted from the general application of the
waiver principles proposed here. Such an exception should not present too great a difficulty,
however. A similar exception was drawn for Articles 3 and 4 from the Article I definition
of "value." See U.C.C. §§ 1-201(44) & cmt. 44, 3-303 & cmt. 1 (1999).
223. Although the Second Restatement did not follow the U.C.C. with respect to the
limited validation of NOM clauses, no convincing reason has been given for this omission.
See E. Allan Farnsworth, Ingredients in the Redaction of the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts, 81 CoLuM L. REv. 1, 11-12 (1981).
224. Grant Gilmore, On the Difficulties of Codifying Commercial Law, 57 YALE L.J.
1341, 1341 (1948) [hereinafter Gilmore, Codifying Commercial Law].
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commercial law should aim to be congruent with commercial practice so
participants in the commercial market will achieve their intended results,
regardless of whether they wind up in court.2 25 Gilmore's point, though,
was that achieving this goal "is a task of considerable difficulty." 226 The
passage of years since Gilmore's article has compounded the difficulty. The
work of Professor Macaulay and others of the "Wisconsin School" has
suggested that businesses often contract with little or no regard to the law,
certainly as it is understood by the professorate, and even as it appears in the
statute books and case reporters. 227 The work of Professor Bernstein has
called into question the very existence of uniform business practices that can
be useful to the law.
228
In the area of contractual change, the import of business practice is
particularly indeterminate. On the one hand, many contracts include NOM
or NOW clauses or both. If that practice were to be validated, such clauses
would be made legally effective. On the other hand, parties often make
informal adjustments to their contracts, regardless of whether the written
agreement contains a NOM or NOW clause. If this practice were validated,
NOM or NOW clauses would be made legally ineffective. 229  What
contracting parties actually do, therefore, seems to require some kind of
compromise.
The idea that the law should codify commercial practice, moreover,
does not take into account the different needs of the courts and the public.
Business practices are enforced in informal ways, like refusing to do
business with someone who is a bully or a comer-cutter. A business needs
to make a unilateral decision only, justified solely by business judgment.
The concerns of courts are different. Courts are public bodies, accountable
to the public either directly or indirectly. The public participates in the
process in the form of a jury, whose power over many decisions cannot be
questioned, but whose decision-making must be channeled and controlled.
In addition, the power of the state is involved in judicial proceedings.
The judgment of a court may well be effected through the use of force
225. See Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An
Analysis of the Interactions Between Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 CAL. L. REV.
261,265-66 (1985).
226. Gilmore, Codifying Commercial Law, supra note 224, at 1341.
227. See GILMORE, DEATH OF CONTRACT, supra note 8, at 3 & n. I (accusing
Macaulay and the Wisconsin School of killing contract); see also LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN,
CONTRACT LAW IN AMERICA: A SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CASE STUDY (1965); Stewart
Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business. A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC. REv.
55 (1963). See generally The Relevance of Contract Theory: A Symposium, 1967 WIS. L.
REv. 803 (1967).
228. See Bernstein, Empirical Basis, supra note 7.
229. See Hillman, CISG, supra note 174, at 450-51 (discussing the import of "actual
business practices").
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against unwilling judgment debtors. This power means that courts are more
constrained than individual businesses, since the court must be able to
justify its decision to the public. A court cannot merely tell a private board
of directors that it was a "business decision," made in the long-term interest
of the company. Put more bluntly, courts must offer a broadly persuasive
justification for a decision, and the persuasiveness of an opinion is much
undermined when a harsh or inequitable result is reached.230 Courts resist
such an outcome, even in the face of a statute to the contrary. The earlier
discussion of the tennis match between the New York Legislature and the
courts of the state underscores this point. In the end, one cannot be
surprised to find the statutory validation of NOM clauses being judicially
supplemented by principles of estoppel.
No purpose is served by a statutory rule that the courts will avoid by
reverting to the common law. Certainty is nice, 23 1 but at some point a
drafter ofa statute must acknowledge the needs-and powers--of the courts.
The statutory rule ought not to raise false hopes of certain outcomes, nor
should it require heroic efforts by courts. For these reasons, the following
proposal attempts to put some real teeth in NOM and NOW clauses, while
recognizing that courts will not mechanically apply an unduly harsh rule.
The stringency of a rule, of course, may well vary in the eyes of different
beholders, but countless cases show that a rule which fails to recognize
reasonable, material, good faith reliance is a rule that is ripe for
supplementation, if not resistance, from the bench. There is little point in
trying to make courts behave otherwise, and there is much harm in making
it appear that the NOM or NOW clause is ironclad when it is not.
232
230. See GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 17 (1977) ("[J]udges want
to decide the cases which come before them sensibly, wisely, even justly. Sense, wisdom, and
justice are community values .....
231. See supra note 1.
232. Many readers will see a strain of Legal Realism here, and I do not deny the
influence of Llewellyn, Corbin, Patterson, and their precursors. This Article is not the place,
however, for a disquisition on the meaning or import of Legal Realism, or for a defense of the
school and its teaching. For a discussion of Legal Realism, interested readers might start with
White, supra note 65, William Twining, TalkAbout Realism, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 329 (1985),
and WILLIAM TWNING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT (1973).
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C. Suggested Statutory Texts and Their Implications
1. PROPOSED LEGISLATION
233
The foregoing explanation of the problems of changing a contract have
shown that legislative revision is required. Here is my attempt:
234
§ 1-304. Course of Performance, Course of Dealing, and Usage
of Trade.
(a) A "course of performance" is established between parties to
a particular agreement if:
(1) the agreement involves repeated occasions for
performance by a party;
(2) that party performs on one or more occasions;235 and
(3) the other party, with knowledge of the nature of the
performance and opportunity to object, accepts the
performance or acquiesces in it without objection.
(b) A "course of dealing" is established between parties by
conduct or expressions that are fairly to be regarded as
establishing a common basis of understanding for interpreting
their other expressions and other conduct.
233. I should state explicitly that I did not make up these sections from scratch. I
merely revised draft provisions that had already received careful attention from one or more
of the revision reporters: Neil Cohen, Article 1; Richard Speidel and Linda Rusch, Article 2;
Marion Benfield, Article 2A; and Raymond Nimmer, Article 2B/U.C.I.T.A. For Professor
Speidel's discussion of some of these problems, see Speidel, Contract Formation, supra note
75, at 1332-34, which is now somewhat superseded. As this Article was going to press, no
work from the new Article 2 reporter, Henry Gabriel, was yet available. '
Another note is also in order: First, in accordance with the recommendation of the PEB
Study Group, no counterpart of U.C.C. § 2-209(3) (regarding the application of the statute
of frauds to modifications) is included in the proposed legislation. See STUDY GROUP
REPORT, supra note 7, at 74-75. The extent to which modifications must satisfy the statute
of frauds should be stated in the statute of frauds, especially since the various articles will
likely make different provisions for the statute of frauds. See supra note 7.
234. This section is the equivalent of U.C.C. §§ 1-205, 2-208 (1999). The section
number given here corresponds to the most recent available draft revision of Article 1.
235. Current law now holds that "[a] single occasion-of conduct does not fall within
the language of this section... ," id. § 2-208 cmt. 4; accord Wilson v. Marquette Electronics,
Inc., 630 F.2d 575, 581-82 (8th Cir. 1980). The revision draft changed this rule before I
began my work. The change is retained here. If a party performs, even once, and the other
party voices no objection at all, the performance is relevant to show what the parties agreed
to, or whether a party waived a right, or whether the parties modified their agreement. The
single performance is not dispositive and is obviously less persuasive than a better established
course of performance. Contrary arguments may be made, but this is not a principal concern
of this Article.
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(c) A "usage of trade" is any practice or method of dealing
having such regularity of observance in a place, vocation or
trade as to justify an expectation that it will be observed with
respect to the agreement in question. The existence and scope
of such a usage are to be proved as facts. If it is established
that such a usage is embodied in a trade code or similar
record the interpretation of the record is a question of law.
(d) A course of performance or course of dealing between the
parties or usage of trade in the vocation or trade in which the
parties are engaged or of which they are or should be aware
is relevant in ascertaining the meaning of the parties'
agreement, may give particular meaning to specific terms of
the agreement, and may supplement or qualify the terms of
the agreement.
(e) The express terms of an agreement and any applicable course
of performance, course of dealing or usage of trade shall be
construed wherever reasonable as consistent with each other.
If such a construction is unreasonable:
(1) express terms prevail over course of performance,
course of dealing, and usage of trade;
(2) course of performance prevails over course of dealing
and usage of trade; and
(3) course of dealing prevails over usage of trade.
(f) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (e) but subject
to the following Section on modification and waiver, a course
of performance is relevant to show a waiver or modification
of any term inconsistent with such course of performance.
(g) Evidence of a relevant usage of trade offered by one party is
not admissible unless that party has given the other party such
notice as the court finds sufficient to prevent unfair surprise.
§ 1-304A.236 Modification and Waiver.
(a) An agreement made in good faith that modifies or rescinds a
contract needs no consideration to be binding.
(b) Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, a term
excluding modification, rescission, or waiver except by an
authenticated record is binding if the term is expressed in a
record authenticated by the party against whom enforcement
of the term is sought. However, to the extent necessary to
avoid injustice, a party is precluded from asserting the term
236. This section is the equivalent of U.C.C. § 2-209 (1999).
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if the party's language or conduct induced the other party to
change its position reasonably, materially, and in good faith.
(c) In the absence of a term governed by subsection (b), a waiver
made through course of performance (Section 1-304(0) or
otherwise may be retracted [if the waiver affects an executory
portion of the contract]237 by giving reasonable notice to the
other party that strict performance will be required, except to
the extent retraction would be unjust in view of a material
change in position in reasonable and good faith reliance on
the waiver.
The proposed sections attempt to balance the competing interests of
certainty, flexibility, and reliance. The policies vying against each other call
for a compromise, and a compromise creates some complexity. As this
Article has attempted to demonstrate, however, an uncompromising statute
simply precipitates a judicial compromise, as the New York experience
attests, which means litigation with its concomitant expense and uncertainty.
While some courts would be willing to enforce a harsh rule for the sake of
certainty or other benefits, not all courts will do so, as the current split over
NOW clauses attests. 238 These divided decisions also caution that a punt to
the bench can seriously undermine the uniformity of commercial law, and
thus one of the chief goals of the U.C.C.2 3 9 For each of the issues identified
in this Article, therefore, the proposed sections attempt to state as clear a
rule as possible, but in some instances, the brightness of the line has been
dimmed by the need to compromise.
240
2. MODIFICATION AND A CLARIFIED HIERARCHY
The proposal's stance regarding whether express terms will prevail over
course of performance is relatively straightforward. Express terms and any
course of performance are to be interpreted consistently, so long as such an
interpretation is reasonable. 241 On the one hand, if it is unreasonable, the
proposal would allow a course of performance to constitute a waiver, thus
237. My preference would be to delete the bracketed words and change the rule. See
supra notes 115-19 and accompanying text.
238. See supra notes 189-205 and accompanying text.
239. See U.C.C. § 1-102(2)(c) (1999).
240. For an analogous discussion, see generally James G. Wilson, Surveying the
Forms of Doctrine on the Bright Line-Balancing Test Continuum, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 773
(1995) (arguing that there is a continuum, and not a dichotomy, between bright-line rules and
balancing tests in the context of constitutional law).
241. See Proposed U.C.C., § 1-304(e), supra Part V.C.I.
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prevailing over the express terms of the contract.242 This provision resolves
the issue of hierarchy, giving greater meaning to the later manifestation of
a party's intent, which presumably reflects a party's current intent more
accurately than the earlier manifestation made at the time the original
contract was formed. On the other hand, waiver by course of performance,
like waivers in general, can be retracted, at least with respect to future
performance. 243 This proviso is important; it is meant to alleviate some of
the concerns voiced by Professor Bernstein regarding the changeable nature
of contractual relationships. 244 A party who makes temporary concessions
to preserve the contractual relationship can return to the original deal by
retracting the waiver. Retraction will remain possible as long as the other
party has not reasonably relied on it. With respect to future occasions for
performance, reliance is unlikely to be reasonable after notice of the
retraction has been served. 245 With a NOW clause, retraction should not
even be necessary in many cases, but that issue is addressed in the next
section of this Article.
Following the recommendation of the PEB Study Group,246 proposed
section 1-304A(a) moves "good faith" from the comments to the text.
247
242. This result is achieved by subjecting proposed section 1-304(e) to subsection
(f) by virtue of the "[n]otwithstanding" clause in (f).
243. See Proposed U.C.C., § i-304A(c), supra Part V.C.1.
244. See Bernstein, Merchant Law, supra note 131, at 1807-15; Ben-Shahar, supra
note 132; see also supra notes 131-34 and accompanying text and infra note 252.
245. See supra note 130.
246. See STUDY GROUP REPORT, supra note 7, at 72-73.
247. Section 1-304A(a) should not provoke too much controversy; its predecessor
did not. See NEW YORK STUDY, supra note 134, at 306-13; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 12A:2-209
cmt. 6 (West 1999). But see supra note 75. One change, though relatively small, should be
mentioned. U.C.C. § 2-209 refers only to "modification" in subsections (1) and (3), but uses
"modification or rescission" in subsections (2) and (4). U.C.C. § 2-209(1)-(4) (1999). The
U.C.C. approach in subsection (1) may make sense according to the following reasoning: An
agreement to rescind a contract that is executory (or partially executory) on both sides does
not lack consideration, so the rescission is valid without subsection (1). The other possible
scenario is that one party has fully executed the contract and the other party has not; in that
instance, the law should not allow rescission without consideration, since (A) the party that
has fully performed ought to get whatever it bargained for, or (B) there is no reason for a
party that has fully performed to agree to a rescission, so the rescission must have been in
violation of the duty of good faith. Because such a categorical approach is inconsistent with
"the flexible character of commercial contracts," id. § 2-208 cmt. 3, 1 have added "or
rescission" to subsection (1). Courts may of course consider whether one party has fully
performed when deciding whether a rescission was made in good faith, and that factor may
be determinative in some cases. But it need not determine all cases. Plus, the addition of"or
rescission" will help prevent hairsplitting arguments on the differences-if any-between
modification, rescission, abandonment, or other change by mutual consent. See id. § 2-209
cmt. 3 (rejecting Green v. Doniger, 90 N.E.2d 56 (N.Y. 1949)).
There is also a minor logical knot. Because the U.C.C. and drafts define an
"agreement" as a "bargain," use of"agreement" in a rule abolishing the need for consideration
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Good faith is the test for the validity of a modification, and it deserves
mention in the statute itself. The arguments in this Article are an attempt to
persuade courts to apply the coercion standard when giving content to the
requirement that modifications be made in good faith. Coerced
modifications are the evil the law seeks to prevent, and coercion should
therefore be the predominant issue when courts are deciding whether a
contracted change should be enforced. Duress should certainly invalidate
an attempted modification, but the standard for duress is, and ought to
remain, high, as may be expected of a defense that will defeat even a
contract supported by consideration.248  Some modifications may be
impermissibly coerced without meeting the elements of duress (e.g., the lack
of a viable judicial remedy), and the flexibility of a coercion standard is
therefore necessary. The coercion standard is not proposed in the statute,
however, in an attempt to keep substantive statutory change to a
minimum.
2 49
3. VALIDATING PRIVATE ATTEMPTS TO REGULATE CHANGE
The proposed legislation does make a substantial but necessary change
with respect to NOM and NOW clauses. 2 ° The legislation would enforce
both kinds of clauses in the same way, but with a limited exception for
reliance.25 1  The proposal is based on the notion that NOM and NOW
clauses have real utility, that they increase certainty, and that they are part
of commercial practice. These conclusions are supported in the latest
economic scholarship252 and are bolstered by an insight from relational
is problematic. See NEW YORK STUDY, supra note 134, at 308; Hillman, U.C.C., supra note
70, at 339 n.40; Murray, supra note 85, at 4 n. 12. I have not found a satisfactory alternative,
though, and the apparent problem does not appear to have caused any difficulties so far.
248. See infra Part VI.C-D.
249. See Hillman, Standards, supra note 171, at 1522 (in absence of particular
reasons to change, best to ."leave well enough alone') (quoting STUDY GROUP REPORT,
supra note 7, at 64); Overby, supra note 214, at 645.
250. See Proposed U.C.C., § 1-304A(b), supra Part V.C. 1; see also Hillman, CISG,
supra note 174, at 449 ("inadequate drafting of the U.C.C.... has been a major source of the
confusion"); Hiliman, UCC., supra note 70, at 335 (U.C.C. approach unsuccessful);
Hillman, Standards, supra note 171, at 1522 (current provisions "ambiguous and confusing"
and "the subject of frequent and perplexing litigation"); cf Overby, supra note 214, at 664-65
& n.102.
251. The reliance exception is thus consistent with the majority opinion in Wisconsin
Knife Works v. National Metal Crafters, 781 F.2d 1280, 1287 (7th Cir. 1986).
252. See generally Ben-Shahar, supra note 132. Professor Ben-Shahar, and perhaps
Professor Bernstein, might prefer to go further; they see the supposed flexibility afforded by
the U.C.C. rules on modification, waiver, and course of performance as at best irrelevant, see
id. at 794-805, and more likely, pernicious. See id. at 806-18; Bernstein, Merchant Law,
supra note 131; see also supra notes 131-34 and accompanying text. Although the work of
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contract theory. Informal adjustments may too easily harden into a course
of performance or waiver. Parties' fear of such a result may lead to rigidity
instead of flexibility in the contract, and it may also undermine the
relationship between the parties. A party should have the power to prevent
a variation from having legal effect; 253 yet an objection would contravene
the norms expected of parties who want to preserve their relationship.
254
Clauses preventing oral modification and waiver can help with these
problems, as well as the untoward results of traditional election law.
255
The proposed legislation therefore declines to revert to the bright-line,
common-law rule that rendered NOM and NOW clauses nugatory. Some
have argued for such a solution, in the absence of any available empirical
research, in order to avoid the confusion inherent in a compromise. 6 But
these scholars is impressive and it informs the proposals here, I am not sure that the time has
come for drastic steps. As Professor Ben-Shahar's work shows, not all the conclusions of
scholars supporting these views have become generally accepted. (The first part of Professor
Ben-Shahar's article disagrees with Professor Bernstein's analysis; he then agrees with
Professor Bernstein's conclusion, but for different reasons.) For further disagreement
between those with an economic perspective, compare Jolls, supra note 15, at 203 (contract
law should enable the parties to agree effectively to prevent modifications), with Johnston,
supra note 57, at 348 & n.25. For further economic analysis of contract modification
problems, see the pieces collected in Johnston, supra note 57, at 342 nn.9-10, and Jolls, supra
note 15, at 204 n.2.
I believe a cautious approach to statutory revision is therefore in order. See Hillman,
Standards, supra note 171, at 1522. The approach I suggest allows the parties to elect a
regime that is arguably better by including NOM and NOW clauses. By making them an
important part of their deal, the clauses should be enforceable even after the multi-factor
inquiry discussed in the text.
253. See U.C.C., § 2-208(l) (1999); proposed U.C.C. § 1-304(a)(3), supra Part
V.C. I, (acquiescence versus objection).
254. See Bernstein, Merchant Law, supra note 131, at 1813; Ben-Shahar, supra note
132, at 815.
255. See supra notes 112-19 and accompanying text.
256. See Newell, supra note 178, at 497-503; Hillman, Standards, supra note 171,
at 1531 (suggesting bright-line rule); Hillman, CISG, supra note 174, at 463 (favoring
common law rather than compromise), 452 (awaiting empirical research), 463 (favoring
enforcement of NOM clauses as empirical research about parties' actual practices likely to
be "costly" and "indeterminate"). I also believe the common-law reversion, whether by
statute orjudicial decision, would reinforce or exacerbate the current lack of uniformity in the
law. Again, New York serves as an example: Despite the prevailing common-law rule
invalidating NOM and NOW clauses, New York decided legislatively to take the opposite
course.
In addition, Professor Hillman's preference for the common-law approach does not
consider the current jurisdictional split over NOW clauses, which suggests that a hardline rule
against NOW clauses would not gain uniform respect. See id. at 463; see also supra notes
189-205 and accompanying text (discussion of divided authority). Since uniformity is one
of the chief goals of the U.C.C. (and this Article), see U.C.C. § 1-I 02(2)(c) (1999), I have not
followed Professor Hillman here, despite his great learning and insight in this area.
Moreover, Professor Hillman has himself pointed out the paternalism inherent in the
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NOM and NOW clauses have too much value to be relegated, again, to
invalidity. The legislation proposed here accords NOM and NOW clauses
legal effect: An oral attempt at modification, rescission, or waiver fails if it
violates a NOM or NOW clause.257 The arguments offered here are not
limited to the realm of commercial transactions; NOM and NOW clauses
should be recognized at common law as well.
In either realm, however, the effectiveness of NOM and NOW clauses
should give way in cases where they would result in real injustice. The
proposed legislation validates NOM and NOW clauses, but recognizes a
limited estoppel exception for reasonable and material changes of position
in good-faith reliance on an oral change. 258  The statute would thus
accommodate the concerns of the courts in such situations,259 but it would
require a party seeking to avoid a NOM or NOW clause to carry a heavy
burden. The proposed statute requires such a party to show that its reliance
was reasonable, material, and in good faith, despite the party's agreement to
the NOM or NOW clause. Each of these showings is fraught with litigation
risk, and the party seeking to enforce the NOM or NOW clause can take
some comfort from the knowledge that its opponent bears a heavy burden.
Some, no doubt, will call for NOM or NOW clauses that are
impregnable to a reliance challenge. They may point to inevitable
uncertainty, potential litigation, 26 and the possible confusion that almost
always results from compromise. 26 1 Uncertainty, however, is not fatal to the
statute. Contracting parties, and businesses in particular, constantly deal in
common-law attitude. See Hillman, CISG, supra note 174, at 451 nn.20-21. Of course, a
compromise could also be avoided by making NOM and NOW clauses ironclad, see id. at
463, but as should be apparent from the text, I believe that hope to be an illusion.
Finally, while I share Professor Hillman's dislike for the effects of compromise,
sometimes it is unavoidable. Even he has not subscribed to the view that contract
modifications themselves should never be enforced, period. Such an argument can plausibly
be made, especially in economic terms, see Varouj A. Aivazian et al., The Law of Contract
Modifications: The Uncertain Quest for a Bench Mark of Enforceability, 22 OsGOODE HALL
L.J. 173, 190-94 (1984), but the argument is ultimately unconvincing. See id. at 212.
257. See Proposed U.C.C., § 1-304A(b), supra Part V.C. 1.
258. See id.
259. See, e.g., Rose v. Spa RealtyAssocs., 366 N.E.2d 1279,1283 (N.Y. 1977). See
supra Part IV.B (on the history New York legislation validating NOM clauses).
260. The litigation risk is greater, too, since the compromise may prevent summary
judgment or dismissal in some (but not all) cases. See Greenberg v. Frey, 593 N.Y.S.2d 217,
218 (App. Div. 1993). On the other hand, the U.C.C. regime is no better in that respect as
the so-called "waiver" exception to NOM-clause enforceability also prevents summary
disposition in some (but not all) cases. Compare Moldex, Inc. v. Ogden Eng'g Corp., 652
F. Supp. 584, 590 (D. Conn. 1987), and Stinnes Interoil, Inc. v. Apex Oil Co., 604 F. Supp.
978, 982 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), with Green Constr. Co. v. First Indem. of Am. Ins. Co., 735 F.
Supp. 1254, 1262 (D. N.J. 1990) (evidence of course of dealing to show waiver required to
prevent summary judgment).
261. See Hillman, CISG, supra note 174, at 463.
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uncertainty and risk. There is no business, and no person, that deals only in
certainty. Under the proposed legislation, it is enough to know that a party
who relies on an oral change despite a NOM or NOW clause does so at its
peril, without certainty of compensation for its reliance. Moreover, the
chance of compensation is further reduced if the parties attend to the factors
for enforcement, discussed below. A party who takes care to point out, or
get a separate signature for, a NOM clause will enjoy a significantly lower
risk of unwanted changes to the contract. The proposed legislation thus
accords the parties a real ability to agree to NOM and NOW clauses that are
likely to be enforced in the proper circumstances.
At the same time, the proposal does not raise an illusionistic hope that
NOM and NOW clauses will always enjoy judicial enforcement. As this
Article has demonstrated, a party who advocates an ironclad rule of NOM
and NOW clause enforcement believing it will avoid litigation risk is
probably kidding itself. At best, such a party can hope for success-after
litigation-in a few jurisdictions. 262 In others, the courts will find a way to
compensate reasonable reliance. 263 As this Article has argued, statutes will
be applied in the courts and must account for the need of courts to justify
their decisions on broadly acceptable grounds.
264
Nevertheless, parties who wish to escape the statutory rules can agree
to arbitrate their disputes before arbitrators who are more likely than courts
to share the same views. A private arbitrator, whose sole power derives
from the consent of the parties, does not have the same concerns as a court,
which is a part of the government, and which wields state power and even
force. In addition, arbitrators are not necessarily expected to apply the
law. 26  The proposed legislation leaves the arbitration option open, then,
and by choosing arbitration parties may avoid the statutory compromise.
266
Regardless of the tribunal, it should be reemphasized that under the
proposed rule many claims of modification or waiver should fail if they
262. See Hale v. Ford Motor Credit Corp., 374 So. 2d 849 (Ala. 1979); General
Grocer Co. v. Bachar, 365 N.E.2d 1106 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977); Van Bibber v. Norris, 419
N.E.2d 115 (Ind. 1981); Wade v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 455 F. Supp. 147 (E.D. Mo. 1978);
Foster Wheeler Enviresponse, Inc. v. Franklin County Convention Facilities Auth., 678
N.E.2d 519 (Ohio 1997); see also Martinsville Nylon Employees Council Corp. v. NLRB,
969 F.2d 1263 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (enforcing NOM clause in collective bargaining agreement).
263. See supra Part IV.B (New York experience) and notes 199-201 (reviewing cases
refusing to honor NOW clauses).
264. See supra Part IV.B.
265. See Bernstein, Opting Out, supra note 136, at 115; Ware, supra note 136, at
704.
266. Cf E. Gary Spitko, Gone But Not Conforming: Protecting the Abhorrent
Testatorfrom Majoritarian Cultural Norms Through Minority-Culture Arbitration, 49 CASE




violate a NOM or NOW clause. Sometimes courts can determine with ease
that there was no reliance at all, most obviously when the party asserting
waiver or modification has done nothing. Another clear fact pattern, which
is perhaps more common, involves a party that has done nothing it would not
have done anyway. A debtor often claims, for instance, that the lender
promised to forbear collection. Or the debtor may simply allege that the
lender granted an extension of time to repay the loan. In many such cases,
the debtor will be unable to show that it did anything in reliance on the
alleged change that it would not have done anyway.2 67 In other cases, the
debtor will not be able to prove any damages.
4. THE RELIANCE COMPROMISE AND ITS LIMITS: FACTORS TO CONSIDER
Some cases, of course, will prove difficult. The comments to the
statute suggest factors to be considered in evaluating reliance under the
estoppel exception of subsection (b). Such factors include whether the
NOM or NOW clause was a negotiated term, separately signed, or otherwise
part of the parties' bargain in fact; or if instead it was merely a term in a
standard form, unknown to the parties. 268  The basic question when
considering this factor would be whether the relying party was aware of the
NOM or NOW clause at the time of reliance. Reliance on an oral waiver or
modification is considerably less likely to be reasonable if the party was
aware of the clause.
Trade usages would thus be relevant, too, since they can make reliance
on oral changes more or less common, and thus expected and reasonable.
Industry practice may suggest that a relying party should be aware of the
hazard of reliance on an oral change, even if the party was not aware of the
NOM or NOW clause in question. 69
267. See, e.g., Lakeside Nat'l Bank v. Vinson Bros., Inc., 607 So. 2d 1009, 1l011 (La.
Ct. App. 1992); Busby v. Parish Nat'l Bank, 464 So. 2d 374, 378 (La. Ct. App. 1985); Beatty
v. Guggenheim Exploration Co., 122 N.E. 378,381 (N.Y. 1919); National Westminster Bank
USA v. Vannier Group, 554 N.Y.S.2d 482,483-84 (App. Div. 1990) (purported reliance was
staying in business instead of liquidating assets); see also Wisconsin Knife Works v. National
Metal Crafters, 781 F.2d 1280, 1288 (7th Cir. 1986).
268. Although a court should take account of such a situation, the proposed section
omits the separate signing requirement for a form supplied by a merchant to a nonmerchant.
See U.C.C. § 2-209(2) (1999). Because of the range of factors to be considered, such a
provision would just add a needless complication; already that clause of section 2-209(2) has
raised issues of interpretation. See Wisconsin Knife, 781 F.2d at 1284. Compared to the
limitations of remedies and the disclaimers of warranties that generally appear in such forms
without any separate assent requirement, NOM and NOW clauses seem relatively innocuous.
269. See, e.g., Foster Wheeler Enviresponse, Inc. v. Franklin County Convention
Facilities Auth., 678 N.E.2d 519, 525 (Ohio 1997) (NOM clauses universal in industry).
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Course of performance would be similarly relevant, but the relationship
of the parties would be a consideration. The NOM or NOW clause may
have been a term in a negotiated contract where both parties, unfamiliar with
each other, knew of the term and wanted it included. Nevertheless, the
parties in such a contract, if it is of long duration, may have grown to trust
each other, with oral modifications or waivers on both sides increasingly
frequent and increasingly reasonable.
The character of the parties themselves is also relevant in determining
how reasonable the reliance is. A powerful or sophisticated party may be
more likely to realize the risk of proceeding on an oral change without a
written confirmation. Such a party is more likely to have procedures in
place that recognize the desirability of putting changes in writing.
Alternatively, a large organization may be particularly vulnerable to agency
problems or communications breakdowns. Because the character of the
parties is taken into account, whether a party is a merchant or a consumer,
for example, will be recognized. On the other hand, a merchant that is a sole
proprietorship will have a different character from a merchant that is a
Fortune 500 company. 27 Similarly, a consumer who has difficulty reading
a contract2 71 will have a different character from a consumer who is a
sophisticated transactor. 272 The proposed legislation therefore avoids a rule
that turns simply on the status of the parties. Instead, it explicitly recognizes
factors that most lawyers know courts will take into account. 273 This does
not mean that the "little guy" will always win; courts are able to consider
274this issue without succumbing to undue sympathy. Moreover, because the
proposed legislation recognizes the role of reliance, there is less need for a
special consumer rule or for excessive judicial solicitude.
In the same vein, both the size of the transaction and the size of the
contractual change also matter. Just as the circumstances surrounding the
parties' original agreement to the NOM or NOW clause are important, so are
the circumstances surrounding the waiver or modification. Reliance on a
modification with precise terms is more reasonable than reliance on
insubstantial talk or ambiguous conduct. Representations or assurances are
also relevant. Formalities matter, as do agency issues: Was there a
270. See, e.g., Wille v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 549 P.2d 903, 904-05 (Kan.
1976) (plaintiff operated a heating and air conditioning service business, apparently as a sole
proprietorship, and sued the telephone monopoly).
271. See Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir.
1965) (considering lack of education).
272. See Schneider v. Miller, 597 N.E.2d 175,178 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991) (practicing
lawyer bought used car "as is").
273. See White, supra note 65, at 7 & n.2.
274. See Wille, 549 P.2d at 911 (plaintiff was able to understand form contract,
which was held not unconscionable).
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handshake 275 between CEO's or a brief phone conversation between
underlings? Proof will also come into play. An agreement with many
witnesses or otherwise susceptible clear proof is more like to lead to
reasonable reliance than ephemeral, unwitnessed talk.2 76 In other words, a
court must inquire into all of the surrounding facts and circumstances of the
contractual change.
These factors take into account Professor Hillman's idea of comparing
the qualities of assent given to the NOM or NOW clause and to the
modification or waiver. 27 These criteria go a step further, however, because
they take into account the parties' sophistication and their reasonable
expectations, as well as their relationship with each other, trade usages, and
the character of the transaction and the reliance. These factors broaden the
inquiry, and thus are more likely to lead to an outcome that accords with the
equities of the facts.
The estoppel exception of subsection (b) is founded on concerns for
basic fairness, and it reflects the courts' treatment of similar legislation.
278
Accordingly, estoppel is not subject to the contrary agreement of the parties.
In the presence of the kind of reliance required by subsection (b), then, a
party would be estopped from relying on a clause stating: "No attempt at
rescission, modification, or waiver shall be binding, unless stated in a
writing signed by both parties. This clause shall be effective without regard
to reliance by either party, and any such reliance is hereby agreed to be
unreasonable." Such a clause should be held to be "a term excluding
modification, rescission, or waiver except by an authenticated record" and
275. See David Ibbetson, From Property to Contract: The Transformation of Sale
in the Middle Ages, 13 J. LEGAL HIST. 1, 5 (1992).
276. It should help, for instance, if the parties reached an oral agreement in front of
twenty bishops. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFCONTRACTS § 139(2)(c) (198 1) (promissory
estoppel exception to statute of frauds partly dependent on corroborating "evidence of the
making and terms of the promise"). But cf Hotchkiss v. National City Bank, 200 F. 287,293
(S.D.N.Y. 1911).
277. See Hillman, CISG, supra note 174, at 464-66; Hillman, Standards, supra note
171, at 1527-29.
278. In addition, the exception favors freedom of contract. The policy in this context,
however, can cut both ways. Should we respect the parties' contract prohibiting oral change,
or should we respect their most recent, oral contract? Compare Hillman, Standards, supra
note 171, at 1526-27, with Jolls, supra note 15, at 208. Although the question can be
answered either way, the paternalism inherent in refusing to enforce NOM and NOW clauses
seems undeniable. See Hillman, CISG, supra note 174, at 451 n.2 1. See generally Anthony
T. Kronman, Paternalism and the Law of Contracts, 92 YALE L.J. 763 (1983). For a more
thorough discussion of "true paternalism," "self paternalism," and "economic efficiency,"
see Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules and
Inalienability: One View ofthe Cathedral, 85 HARv. L. REv. 1089, 1094, 1111-15 (1972),
which arguably supports enforcement of NOM and NOW clauses that the parties have agreed
to include in their contract.
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thus unenforceable if the reliance test is met. 279 A court may find, though,
that reliance would be unreasonable by a party who agreed to such a
clause-and especially by a party that was actually aware of the clause. To
reach such a conclusion, the court would need to undertake the multi-factor
inquiry into reasonableness. 28 Nevertheless, a party who included such a
clause in its contracts, and who took care to obtain a separate signature,
could greatly increase the strength of the clause and the likelihood of
winning a summary judgment.
5. SOME LIMITS ON THE RELIANCE EXCEPTION
The reliance principle ofestoppel brings with it an important limitation.
When the reliance interest ends, so does the estoppel. For example, a seller
or a lender who has accepted ten late payments in a row without objection
should not be allowed to repossess on the ground that the eleventh payment
arrived as late as the others. If the seller or lender becomes exasperated, it
can inform the other party that strict compliance will be required in the
future. 28' At that point, any further reliance on the course of performance
would likely be unreasonable, and the creditor may justly resort to any
available remedy if the next payment is late (including, for an Article 9
lender, repossession).282
This limitation also means that a NOW clause will prevent an unwritten
waiver from being effective if it applies only to the past, instead of to
279. Proposed U.C.C. § 1-304A(b), supra Part V.C.1. Courts should so hold
regardless of the form that the NOW or NOM clause takes. A clause providing that "strict
compliance with payment deadlines is required even if the creditor accepts late payments" is
a NOW clause just as much as one that explicitly refers to waiver.
280. In comment form, the suggested factors for a court to consider would lack the
force of statutory law. Nevertheless, the text of the proposed statute makes clear that
reasonable reliance is possible, even by a party that has agreed to a NOM or a NOW clause.
Since this much is apparent from the text, the only question will be how to determine what
constitutes reasonable reliance. Courts are, of course, free to disregard the factors included
in the comments, and no doubt judges will consider a number of relevant factors not
mentioned here. The important point is that some inquiry is required into reasonableness; the
proposed statutory text itself precludes a holding that reliance is per se unreasonable in the
presence of a NOM or NOW clause.
281. For examples of cases requiring such a notice from a party who has been
accepting late payments, see Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Waters, 273 So. 2d 96, 100 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1973); Cobb v. Midwest Recovery Bureau Co., 295 N.W.2d 232, 236-37 (Minn.
1980); Nevada Nat'l Bank v. Huff, 582 P.2d 364, 369 (Nev. 1978).
282. This conclusion results from the "to the extent" language and the reasonableness
and good faith requirements of proposed section 1-304A(b). Proposed subsection (c), which
contains a similar rule regarding retraction of waivers, buttresses this result by analogy, but




executory portions of the contract. A waiver with respect to the past,
sometimes called a "waiver after breach" or "election waiver," 283 cannot be
relied upon: How could the nonwaiving party rely on a waiver that has not
yet happened? Although Professor Murray argues to the contrary,284 a party
cannot change its position in reliance on the waiver until the waiver occurs.
Suppose in a single-delivery contract the buyer says, "It's okay that the
wheat was a week late." Since the waiver is directed at the past, there
cannot have been any relevant change in position in reliance on the waiver.
No reliance is possible, and in the absence of reliance, the NOW clause will
be enforced.28 This provision thus allows parties to plan their relations in
a way that will prevent the unwitting waivers and anomalies that result from
the law of election.
286
Proposed section 1-304A(b) is drafted to foreclose a different argument
for escape from a NOM or NOW clause. Some have suggested that
exceptions to the statute of frauds writing requirements should also be
exceptions to the application of a NOM or NOW clause.287 According to
these arguments, special manufacture, part performance, or judicial
admission 288 would ipso facto defeat the NOM or NOW clause. The
289proposed legislation rejects this approach, on the basis that the estoppel
provided in subsection (b) should be sufficient to prevent injustice.
Expanding the range of exceptions would tip the balance too far away from
the enforceability of NOM or NOW clauses.
The arguments of Professor Murray to the contrary seem
unconvincing. 29 The proposal in this Article therefore follows the majorityof the PEB Study Group.29' Professor Murray's position takes a narrow
283. See supra Part III.B.l & n.104.
284. See Murray, supra note 85, at 42.
285. In an installment contract, of course, there could be reliance with respect to
future deliveries. For example, the seller may think it acceptable to deliver late in the future.
This fact, however, does not affect the analysis in the text, since that reliance is directed
toward an executory part of the contract. The same is true if the seller has a right to cure; the
seller may rely on the waiver and thus fail to cure, but the curative action is in the future and
is executory. The effect of the waiver on the executory part of the contract is subject to a
different rule: in the presence of a NOW clause, a multi-factor inquiry is required, and the
party relying bears a heavy burden. In the absence of such a clause, the test is considerably
less onerous, since no contractual agreement makes the reliance appear unreasonable.
286. See supra notes 112-19 and accompanying text.
287. See Murray, supra note 85, at 31-33, 54. But see Eisler, supra note 4, at 419-
20.
288. See U.C.C. § 2-201(3) (1999).
289. Proposed section 1-304A(b) starts, "[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this
subsection." Proposed U.C.C. § 1-304A(b), supra Part V.C. I. The negation should be
bolstered by the absence of an equivalent to section 2-209(3). See supra note 7.
290. For his views, see generally Murray, supra note 85, at 28-33.
291. See STUDY GROUP REPORT, supra note 7, at 74.
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view of the purposes a NOM clause can serve, only accounting for the
evidentiary piece. Aside from the evidentiary function, cautionary and
channeling concerns must also be accommodated. There are problems of
agency, and of ill-considered or casual remarks.292 In addition to these
classic contract functions, a corporation, for example, may want paper for
record-keeping, auditing, planning, or due-diligence purposes.293 These
concerns are not addressed by the exceptions to the statute of frauds. Most
importantly, Professor Murray's argument ignores the most basic distinction
between the statute of frauds and a NOM or NOW clause. The statute of
frauds is immutable, and must be satisfied whether the parties want it or not.
A NOM or NOW clause appears only if the parties agree to it.
An example suggested by Professor Eisler may help to clarify this
point.294 NOM clauses, among other things, can serve to protect parties
whose agents might otherwise give away too much. For instance, a salesman
might orally agree to a modification, while the home office would not agree
to it. A properly drafted NOM clause should protect the principal from the
salesman's oral modification. If the attempt at modification were litigated,
the principal would have to admit that the salesman had agreed to an oral
modification. While this admission might defeat a statute of frauds
defense, 295 and would satisfy evidentiary concerns, it ought not to defeat the
NOM clause that was bargained for in order to preclude such modifications.
6. RULES IN THE ABSENCE OF A NOM OR NOW CLAUSE
The effectiveness of NOM and NOW clauses is highlighted by a
comparison to the situation without such a clause. In the absence of a NOM
or NOW clause, without an applicable provision of the statute of frauds, the
parties are free to effect their modifications, rescissions, or waivers in
whatever manner they wish. Under subsection (c), a waiver is immediately
effective. If a party does waive a condition, proposed section 1-304A(c)
governs whether the waiver may be retracted. The standard is similar to but
purposefully different from the reliance standard of subsection (b). Waivers
292. See Hillman, Standards, supra note 171, at 1522 ("inadvertent or unwise oral
changes"); cf. Wisconsin Knife Works v. National Metal Crafters, 781 F.2d 1280, 1286 (7th
Cir. 1986) (according more respect to parties' attempts to regulate modifications because of
the abolition of the preexisting duty rule); Hillman, CISG, supra note 174, at 453 (same).
293. Llewellyn himself recognized the special needs businesses have for writings.
See Karl N. Llewellyn, The Karl Llewellyn Papers, C.I.4, Markup draft entitled "On
Transactions and Writing," at I (n.d.) (unpublished collection, available at the University of
Chicago D'Angelo Law Library) ("needs and internal organization of business outfits"). The
same document discusses the benefits and desirability of NOM.clauses at 18-19.
294. See Eisler, supra note 4, at 419.
295. See U.C.C. § 2-201(3)(b) (1999).
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that go to executed parts of the contract would be revocable if this Article's
argument about election is accepted and the bracketed language is deleted.
Otherwise, traditional (and current) election doctrine will be retained, and
waivers that affect executed parts of the contract could not be revoked.296
While retraction is possible if the waiver affects an executory part of
the contract, any reliance that is more than minimal prevents retraction.
While the reference to "unjust" gives the court some flexibility, the relying
party bears only a light burden under subsection (c), so long as it did not act
unreasonably or in bad faith. There is no NOM or NOW clause to make
reliance seem unreasonable. Under subsection (b), by contrast, the relying
party bears a heavier burden of proof-and of uncertainty that its reliance
will be protected.
Admittedly, the scheme proposed here is complex, but the complexity
is engendered by the need to compromise between the competing policies of
certainty, flexibility, and reliance. This difficulty is no surprise. As
observed at the beginning of this Article, change is both antithetical to
contract and inevitable in actuality. The reconciliation of these opposing
concepts results in real costs on each side. Some reliance will fail to meet
the test of section 1-304A(b). Certainty will be undermined because NOM
and NOW clauses are not impregnable. There will be litigation costs.
Compromises inevitably undermine precision and certainty. 297 The proposal
here attempts to minimize these costs and to distribute them rationally. The
proposed rules also attempt to give judges the tools and the flexibility to
decide difficult cases, instead of prompting judicial confusion or resistance,
as an all-or-nothing approach would do. At times during the revision of the
U.C.C., such rigid approaches have come to the fore. As this Article has
shown, however, a failure to compromise will lead to resistance or
circumvention in hard cases, with corresponding confusion in the case law.
The supposed certainty or predictability afforded by a bright line is an
illusion.
D. Confirmation by Comparison
In attempting to solve problems in the common law, it is often
instructive to consult other solutions to the same problem. As Professors
Speidel and Hillman have pointed out, the United Nations Convention on
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG) does address the
problem of NOM clauses, and in a more straightforward way than the
296. See supra notes 112-19 and accompanying text.
297. See, e.g., Hillman, CISG, supra note 174, at 458.
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current U.C.C.298  After dispensing with the preexisting duty rule, 299 in
accord with the civil law and the U.C.C., article 29 of the CISG provides:
A contract in writing which contains a provision requiring
any modification or termination by agreement to be in writing may
not be otherwise modified or terminated by agreement. However,
a party may be precluded by his conduct from asserting such a
provision to the extent that the other party has relied on that
conduct.
300
The provision was reconfirmed more recently when UNIDROIT adopted a
nearly identical provision as one of its Principles of International
Commercial Contracts.
30 1
As is apparent from the text, the international provision follows an
estoppel approach to NOM clauses. In keeping with the current state of the
law, it ignores NOW clauses. Overall, however, the international rule is the
same as the one proposed in this Article. In addition, the proposed statutory
language, and especially the factors suggested for consideration, should fill
out the CISG provision and make it considerably more definite. This
expanded treatment should help answer some of the criticisms leveled
against article 29.302
298. See generally id.; Richard E. Speidel, The Revision of UCC Article 2, Sales in
Light ofthe United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 16
N.W. J. INT'L L. &Bus. 165 (1995); John E. Murray, Jr., The EmergingArticle 2: The Latest
Iteration, 35 DUQ. L. REV. 533 (1997). For the view that the CISG is not an appropriate
model for the U.C.C. revision, see Henry D. Gabriel, The Inapplicability of the United
Nations Convention on the International Sale of Goods as a Modelfor the Revision ofArticle
Two of the Uniform Commercial Code, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1995 (1998). Professor Gabriel
acknowledges, however, that the CISG is appropriate for "selective borrowing." Id. at 2014.
Cf. Franco Ferrari, The Relationship Between the UCC and the CISG and the Construction
of Uniform Law, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1021, 1022-24 (1996) (U.C.C. and CISG interpretive
modes too different to allow comparison).
299. See United Nations Convention on the International Sale of Goods art. 29(1)
(Vienna 1980) [hereinafter CISG] ("A contract may be modified or terminated by the mere
agreement of the parties.").
300. Id. art. 29(2).
301. See UNIDROIT, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS art.
2.18 (Rome 1994).
302. See Hillman, Standards, supra note 171, at 1526 (CISG art. 29(2) "leave[s]
open the type of 'conduct' and 'reliance' that can bar the assertion of a NOM clause");
Hillman, CISG, supra note 174, at 460-63 (discussing same).
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VI. OPPORTUNITIES OUTSIDE THE STATUTE
A. Quasi-Contract
Aside from the proposed statutory compromise, quasi-contract
represents another middle road, and it does not depend on legislative action.
Permitting a quasi-contract action for unjust enrichment where a
modification fails because of a NOM clause is a natural solution; courts can
compensate a relying party, despite a NOM or NOW clause, but only to the
extent of the restitution interest. This solution is appealing in many senses,
and the proposed legislation leaves open its potential. In particular, a court
so inclined could find that a party failed to meet the relatively high standard
that proposed section 1-304A(b) sets for abrogation of a NOM or NOW
clause. The court could nevertheless allow a quasi-contractual action ("off
the contract") for unjust enrichment. Such actions limit damages to the
benefit actually conferred upon the other party. This restitution measure of
damages is usually considerably less than the expectancy measure, which is
used in ordinary contract actions. The use of the lowest measure of damages
could serve as a forceful incentive to comply with NOM clauses.
Leoni v. Delany,303 a case from the statute of frauds, demonstrates the
analysis. The Leoni court held that "the unenforceability of an otherwise
valid contract.., gives rise to the right of relief through the medium of a
common count. The law contemplates that when one receives a benefit at
the expense or detriment of another, he should compensate the latter to the
extent of the reasonable value of the benefit received. ' '304 Put in terms of the
present context, a NOM clause is a defense to plaintiff's assertion of an oral
modification and its breach by defendant. A court wishing to give a strong
holding of validity for NOM clauses could uphold this defense, but to
prevent unjust enrichment, allow the plaintiff to reply with a showing that
it conferred a benefit on the defendant.
30 5
Although this Article argues that a NOM or NOW clause differs in306
important respects from the public statute of frauds, such clauses are like
the statute in that agreements that do not meet the formal requirements are
unenforceable. Recovery according to the contract, or in the present context
according to the oral modification, is therefore barred. Nevertheless, if one
party has conferred a benefit upon the other, compensation is allowed to the
extent of the value or benefit received by the other party.
303. 188 P.2d 765 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1948).
304. Id. at 767.
305. See Richard A. Epstein, Pleadings and Presumptions, 40 U. CIII. L. REv. 556,
571 n.30 (1973).
306. See supra notes 287-95 and accompanying text.
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The NOM case for quasi-contract is even stronger than the case for the
ordinary statute of frauds. In the ordinary case, no enforceable contract
exists at all. Even if a benefit is conferred, the absence of an enforceable
contract raises questions about whether the benefit was the result of a gift or
intermeddling, neither of which is compensable in quasi-contract. In the
case of a modification met by a NOM clause defense, there is at least one
enforceable contract. The existence of the contract would tend to show that
the benefit was conferred with the expectation of compensation and within
a contractual or commercial relationship. Concerns about volunteers and
intermeddlers should be correspondingly diminished.
B. Definition of Waiver
Like current law, the proposed legislation does not purport to define
"waiver," despite the recommendation of the PEB Study Group. 30 7
Proposed section 1-304A(c) notes that a waiver may be made by course of
performance "or otherwise," allowing the courts to find waiver in
accordance with the common law as well as under the Code. This Article
offers a concrete definition of "waiver," distinguishing that doctrine from
both "estoppel" and "modification.
'" 30 8
An attempt at definition in the statute, however, is unlikely to prove
helpful. Waiver has been an essential tool for courts to maintain the
flexibility of commercial contracts. A cabined statutory definition, even if
one is possible, would not aid the courts in this enterprise, nor would it
provide the parties with meaningfully greater certainty. 30 9 For parties or
courts that need to know more about waiver, research into the common law
is not only unavoidable as a practical matter but also desirable from a policy
standpoint. The play and development in the common law is inescapable.
Any attempt to define waiver in a short space would be at best misleading
and could be unduly constraining.
307. See STUDY GROUP REPORT, supra note 7, at 76.
308. See supra Part III.A.
309. "A voluntary relinquishment of a known right" is a misleading definition, as
explained above. See supra notes 85-88 and accompanying text. What appears to be a longer
attempt at definition in the STUDY GROUP REPORT, supra note 7, at 76 n.48, grew larger still
in one version of Rev. U.C.C. § 2-210 n.2 (draft of Jan. 24, 1997), supra note 211, and this
longer attempt suggests that the earlier effort left out some important points. Even in this
large definition there appears to be inconsistency. See Rev. U.C.C. § 2A-302 drafting
comment (draft of Jan. 28, 1997) (criticizing the Art. 2 draft because draft section 2-210(d)
& n.(2) limit waiver to terms that are "not part of the agreed performance" at the same time
that draft section 2-210(a) eliminates consideration for good faith modifications).
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C. Why Duress Doctrine Answers the Wrong Question
Some scholarly judges and judicious scholars have suggested that
contract modification issues ought to be answered with duress doctrine.
310
A few courts have accepted this invitation, but the results should sound a
warning. Duress doctrine has become diluted because it is being forced to
do ajob for which it was not designed. Equally disturbing is the willingness
of some courts, under the guise of duress doctrine, to condone contract
modifications that were admittedly coerced.
Duress doctrine developed as a means to avoid otherwise valid
contracts. A contract could be perfectly supported by consideration and yet
fall to a duress claim. Since a successful claim of duress can void an
otherwise valid contract, the requirements of duress have traditionally been
set high. The earlier days of duress doctrine recall the different atmosphere
in which the common law grew up. If a party could not show actual,
physical compulsion, the party would have to show a very impressive threat.
Duress by threat was restricted to fear of death or of mayhem.311 Mayhem
required an injury resulting in permanent dismemberment or disablement;
when disfigurement was added by statute it still did not make duress exactly
an easy defense to mount. 12 The elements were stringent, but such controls
were thought necessary to protect the security of contracts.
The duress defense has been liberalized over the centuries, 3 13 but even
today a mere threat is not enough. Under the relatively liberal Restatement
standard, the threat must be "improper," and not just any threat of a breach
of contract will do. Moreover, the party claiming duress must have had no
310. See, e.g., United States v. Stump Home Specialties Mfg., 905 F.2d 1117, 1122
(7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J.) (citing Wisconsin Knife Works v. National Metal Crafters, 781
F.2d 1280, 1286 (7th Cir. 1986)); FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS, supra note 86, § 4.22, at 282-
83 (U.C.C. requirements of good faith conflated with duress); Hillman, Restatement, supra
note 29, at 702-03; Hillman, Policing, supra note 70, at 900-01; Richard Nathan, Grappling
with the Pre-Existing Duty Rule: A Proposal for a Statutory Amendment, 23 AM. Bus. L.J.
509, 549 (1986) (proposing economic duress as the statutory test for modifications); Mather,
supra note 65, at 615; RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 4.2, at 111 (5th
ed. 1998); cf Johnston, supra note 57, at 340 ("duress doctrine collapses entirely into the
good faith test"), 383-85; 1 WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 4, § 1-6, at 35 (not distinguishing
between contract modifications that should fail because of bad faith, unconscionability, or
duress); Thornton E. Robison, Enforcing Extorted Contract Modifications, 68 IOWA L. REV.
699 (1983) (advocating enforcement of certain extorted modifications when the extortion
cannot be deterred and is better than nonperformance).
311. See Silsbee v. Webber, 50 N.E. 555, 557 (Mass. 1898) (Knowlton, J.,
dissenting).
312. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 979 (6th ed. 1990).
313. The majority opinion in Silsbee, 50 N.E. at 555-57, written by Holmes himself,
is a prime example.
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reasonable alternative but to accede to the threat.114 With the availability of
temporary restraining orders and other injunctive relief, as well as police
intervention, such showings cannot often be made. This is as it should be,
for if contracts are to remain meaningfully secure, they cannot be
undermined by defenses that are too tempting to assert and too easy to show.
Some courts, meanwhile, have shown a tougher attitude than the Second
Restatement. A number of cases still see the world of contract as a rugged
place where participants in the market must expect rough play. These courts
even refuse to allow a party to escape a contract into which it has been
coerced.315 This strong stance on duress is well-justified when applied to
ordinary contracts, which ought not to be undermined too readily.
The problem comes when the duress standard is imported into a realm
of contract law where consideration is no longer relevant. For the reasons
explained above, the preexisting duty rule is a poor tool for preventing
baneful modifications, and the rule has been abolished for good faith
modifications under the U.C.C., and to some extent, outside the U.C.C.
316
Yet even the preexisting duty rule works better than duress in at least some
modification situations. In a typical "holdup," for example, one party
refuses to perform unless paid more. This is a threat of breach, but it does
not amount to duress, even under the liberal standard of the Second
Restatement.317  The preexisting duty rule would have invalidated the
modification, and the application of the rule to such a holdup would have
been considered one of the most important functions of contract law.318 Yet
the duress doctrine might uphold such a modification. Professor Eisler, for
instance, reads section 2-209 "to permit the extortion of a modification if the
extortionist had a legitimate commercial reason."
319
314. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 175 &cmt. b, 176(1981).
315. See Roth Steel Prods. v. Sharon Steel Corp., 705 F.2d 134, 148 (6th Cir. 1983)
(citing Business Incentives, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 397 F. Supp. 63, 69 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)
("in context of economic duress, coercive conduct permissible in light of contractual right to
terminate"); Jamestown Farmers Elevator, Inc. v. General Mills, Inc., 552 F.2d 1285, 1290
(8th Cir. 1977) ("'good faith insistence upon a legal right [with coercive effect] which one
believes he has usually is not duress, even if it turns out that that party is mistaken and, in
fact, has no such right."')).
316. See U.C.C. § 2-209 cmt. b (1999). See also supra notes 27 and 71.
317. See Johnston, supra note 57, at 384 ("It is beyond dispute that the threat to
breach if a contract is not modified is not itself the sort of improper threat required to find
duress."). The breach is not an effort to exact an advantage under another contract, unlike
Austin Instrument, Inc. v. Loral Corp., 272 N.E.2d 533, 534-35 (N.Y. 1971).
318. See Selmer Co. v. Blakeslee-Midwest Co., 704 F.2d 924, 927 (7th Cir.
1983); Wisconsin Knife Works v. National Metal Crafters, 781 F.2d 1280, 1285 (7th Cir.
1986).
319. Eisler, supra note 4, at 410.
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The Sixth Circuit takes a different view, but it is also willing to allow
a certain amount of coercion. Roth Steel Products v. Sharon Steel Corp.
involved a contract for the sale of the eponymous product.320 When the
market began to shift, the seller refused to deliver any more steel to the
buyer unless the buyer agreed to a price increase (to simplify the facts
somewhat). The court opined that "although coercive conduct is evidence
that a modification of a contract is sought in bad faith, that prima facie
showing may be effectively rebutted by the party seeking to enforce the• • 321 erpsto
modification. Tellingly, the court cited duress cases for the proposition
that coercion is not necessarily enough to invalidate a contract.322 Although
the court found that the seller had failed to rebut the presumption of bad
faith, the implications of the case are still clear enough. Under the U.C.C.
regime, a modification obtained through coercive conduct may well be
valid.323
The implication of the Sixth Circuit opinion and the apparent view of
Professor Eisler show why the duress standard is too restrictive when
applied to a modification. Duress will invalidate any contract, but mere
coercion is not enough to constitute duress. A party being pressured should
step away or bear the consequences of the contract, supported by
consideration, to which it agreed. Yet for the reasons explained in the first
part of this Article, the consideration doctrine has rightly been rejected for
judging modifications under the U.C.C., and it should be rejected outside the
U.C.C. as well. If consideration is not relevant to the enforceability of a
modification, however, a party ought to be able to challenge the
modification under a more lenient standard than duress.
Contrary to the position of the Restatement drafters, 32 4 the fact that the
modification is incident to a preexisting bargain does not allow any hope for
the coerced party. This fact is no more relevant than the rescission device
used by some of the old cases. Both criteria apply equally to modifications
"induced by unfair pressure" 325 and to modifications made in good faith, all
of which are auxiliary to preexisting exchanges.32 6 Although the preexisting
contract may suggest that the relationship has social "utility," as the
320. See Roth Steel Prods., at 705 F.2d at 137.
321. 705 F.2d 134, 148 (6th Cir. 1983).
322. Seeid. (citing Business Incentives, 397 F. Supp. at69;Jamestown Farmers, 552
F.2d at 1290).
323. See U.C.C. §§ 2-209(1), 2A-208(1) (1999).
324. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 89 cmt. a (1981) ("[A]djustments
are ancillary to exchanges and have some of the same presumptive utility
.... [R]elation to a bargain tends to satisfy the cautionary and channeling functions of legal
formalities.").
325. Id. § 89 cmt. b.
326. See id. § 89 cmt. a.
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Restatement says, the preexisting contract does nothing to protect against
baneful modification.
At bottom, then, neither the duress standard, nor the preexisting duty
rule, nor the Second Restatement does an adequatejob of preventing coerced
modifications. Moreover, importing the duress standard into contract
modification would do harm in at least two ways. First, it would likely
dilute the duress standard, and arguably has already done so.
32 7
Consideration-supported contracts that ought to be valid would be voidable
as the bar is lowered to take into account transactions lacking a bargain.
Second, as Roth Steel shows, the bar is still too high for modifications
without consideration, since at least some modifications that are avowedly
coerced will be valid. Duress, in short, would operate as a doctrine that
leads both to under- and over-enforcement-a doctrine no better than the
one it replaces.
328
D. A New Test: Coercion
Instead of following the path of duress or simply leaving the good-faith
standard formless, this Article proposes a coercion standard for judging
modifications. I hope it will appear in the comments to the revised U.C.C.,
and in any event, the courts should adopt it as a matter of common law. The
proposed test for coercion, like the test for duress, has two prongs: (1) there
must be a threat to deprive the victim of a legal right, and (2) the victim must
act reasonably. 329 That the test for coercion is less stringent than the test for
duress should be readily apparent since duress requires (1) not just a threat
but an improper threat and (2) that the victim have no reasonable alternative
but to accede to the threat. Because coercion lowers the bar from the duress
standard, coercion would be appropriate for modifications that may lack
consideration. This proposed new standard has the benefit of separating the
law of duress, which would continue to apply to contracts supported by
consideration, from the modification context, which ought not to be hobbled
with the preexisting duty rule or the strict duress standard. As a result, the
problem of under- and over-enforcement, inherent under both the preexisting
duty rule and the duress standard, would be reduced or eliminated.
327. See POSNER, supra note 310, § 4.7, at 126 (including monopolies as duress);
Garvin, supra note 1, at 135-38 (arguing that demanding an adequate assurance of
performance under U.C.C. section 2-609 "certainly looks like" or "might be looked at as an
example of duress").
328. For a different criticism of the duress standard in this context, see Johnston,
supra note 57, at 383-85.
329. The remarkable clarity of ALAN WERTHEIMER, COERCION (1987) has helped me
to think about the formulation of this test.
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In justifying this new standard, it is appropriate first to notice what is
lost with the abolition of the preexisting duty rule. Consideration, after all,
serves important evidentiary, cautionary, and channeling or signaling
functions. 33  Where there is consideration, there is more likely to be
evidence of the agreement. If a party is going to have to exchange
something in order to get what it wants, it is more likely to be cautioned
before entering the transaction. And the bargain serves to signal which
agreements the law will enforce. Each aspect is similarly relevant in the
context of modification. When there is some new element on both sides of
the exchange, a modification is more likely to be proven with greater
certainty. A party who has to give up something is more likely to pay due
attention before agreeing to a change in the contract, and is more likely to
realize that it will be held to the change.
If the preexisting duty rule is abolished, however, consideration will not
serve the functions it has traditionally served in supporting contract
modifications. And the cases and casebooks teach that alleged modifications
are as troublesome as the original contract; if anything, the problem of
coercion seems more prevalent in the modification context than in cases
involving initial contracts.331 Some added protection for the party resisting
an allegation of a modification is necessary. This protection may be in two
forms. One form of protection can come by way of the parties' own
planning at the drafting stage. They can accord themselves greater
insulation against change by including NOM and NOW clauses. As
discussed above, the proposed legislation recognizes the value of those
clauses, and they are given as much effect as is realistically possible. The
second form of protection against change is the power of invalidation, held
by the courts. Coercion is the standard suggested here for determining
which alleged modifications to enforce, in the absence of stricter
requirements that the parties impose on themselves.
Perhaps the primary theoretical objection to the new standard is that
virtually all contracts can include some degree of compulsion.332 Behind
330. See supra note 118.
331. As Professor Garvin has observed, several leading casebooks teach duress and
modification together. See Garvin, supra note 1, at 135 n.293 (citing JOHN P. DAWSON ET
AL., CASES AND COMMENT ON CONTRACTS 569-603 (6th ed. 1993); E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH
& WILLIAM F. YOUNG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONTRACTS 352-71 (5th ed. 1995);
CHARLES L. KNAPP & NATHAN M. CRYSTAL, PROBLEMS IN CONTRACT LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 786-807 (3d ed. 1993)).
332. The seminal work is perhaps Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a
Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 POL. Sci. Q. 470 (1923). See also ROBERT L. HALE,
FREEDOMTHROUGH LAW 124 (1952) ("there is compulsion in all contracts"); Robert L. Hale,
Bargaining, Duress, and Economic Liberty, 43 COLUM. L. REv. 603 (1943); 1 WHITE &
SUMMERS, supra note 4, § 1-6; Mather, supra note 65, at 615 (difficult "to identify [what]
forms of coercion are wrongful").
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each bargain is the implicit statement, "If you don't give me what I want, I
won't give you what you want."333 In common parlance and prevailing
mores, however, this kind of so-called "compulsion" or "coercion" is not
only tolerated but encouraged.334 The question becomes, then, what
constitutes coercion.
The first prong of the test requires a threat to deprive the victim of a
legal right. Suppose A makes a proposal to B, and a court must determine
whether that proposal is a threat. This prong attempts to capture the
difference between a threat, in which A proposes to make B worse off, and
an offer, in which A proposes to make B better off. Then the question
becomes, better or worse off than what? Several possible answers appear in
the philosophical literature. The answer could be: Better or worse off than
(a) where B could expect to be if A acted morally, (b) where B could expect
to be if A acted in accordance with statistical likelihoods, and (c) where B
could expect to be if A acted in accord with B's subjective expectations.
335
The philosophers do not agree on which baseline to use, but some baseline
is necessary. 336 The proposed test uses the baseline that is within the
competence of the law: where B could expect to be if A does not violate B's
legal rights. If A proposes to deprive B of something to which B is legally
entitled, then A has made a threat within the meaning of the coercion test.
Note that such a threat is not necessarily an "improper threat" under the
duress test, since many threats of breach are not improper but do threaten to
deprive B of a contractual right.
Stated hypothetically, then, when A and B have no contract and A says,
"I won't give you my wheat unless you give me $2.50 a bushel for it," the
statement says only that the speaker will keep what is his already. If the
333. The same thing, but the other way around, is expressed in ADAM SMITH, THE
WEALTH OF NATIONS 118 (Penguin Books Ltd. 1982) (1776): "Whoever offers to another
a bargain of any kind, proposes to do this: Give me that which I want, and you shall have this
which you want ......
334. This Article takes an unabashedly pro-capitalist view. Professor Robert Nozick
goes a fair way toward justifying the capitalist scheme against coercion claims, first with his
influential chapter Coercion, in PHILOSOPHY, SCIENCE, AND METHOD 440, 447-53 (Sidney
Morgenbesser et al. eds., 1969) [hereinafter Nozick, Coercion], and later in ANARCHY,
STATE, AND UTOPIA 262-63 (1974). WERTHEIMER, supra note 329, at 251-55, also gives a
cogent critique of the left-wing theories, Marxist and non-Marxist. The philosophers,
however, address considerably broader questions than those discussed here; I simply assume
a capitalist system of commercial and contractual transactions, more or less along the lines
of the one we have in the United States (i.e., with a basic assumption of freedom of contract,
but with occasional regulatory intervention). I also assume that all involved (courts,
legislatures, contracting parties, lawyers) consider that system to be good.
335. See Nozick, Coercion, supra note 334, at 447; WERTHEIMER, supra note 329,
at 204.
336. For adiscussion ofthe problem and citations to the literature, see WERTHEIMER,
supra note 329, at 204-14.
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sailors, however, say "We will breach our employment contract with you
unless you double our wages," they are threatening to take away something
that the shipowner already has a right to. Because of the preexisting
contract, the shipowner, in a sense, already owns the right to have the sailors
work. If they threaten to take this right away, they are taking the
shipowner's property.337 This is a kind of threat the law should not
condone, and the first prong of the test is satisfied.
The second prong, that B act reasonably, must also be met if B is to
escape the modification. Even if A has made a threat, B is not allowed
unreasonably to string A along. Again, concrete examples may help
illustrate. Recall the wheat sale, where A contracts to sell B wheat at $2.50
a bushel on September 1. Suppose the price rises sharply and A threatens
not to deliver unless B pays $5 a bushel. In this holdup, A has made a threat,
but B must act reasonably. Courts should find that B meets the second prong
of the test where B agrees to the higher price because of commitments to its
own customers, because of likely loss of good will from those customers for
failed delivery (for which damages are likely uncertain and therefore
unrecoverable in a suit against A), and because there are no available
alternative suppliers (which is conceivable in the kind of conditions that
cause prices to double).
This case is too easy, though; it may even meet the "no reasonable
alternative" prong of the duress test. Suppose instead that a breach by A
would not lead B to suffer an unquantifiable loss of good will. Now B has
two reasonable alternatives: To sue on A's breach and recover damages or
to agree to pay $5 to A. The second course may be more attractive,
especially in view of the expense, delay, and risk inherent in litigation, but
suit on the contract is nevertheless a reasonable alternative (at least in the
eyes of the law). B cannot meet the duress test. If B agrees to the $5 price,
however, it can escape the coerced modification.
A matrix of cases (Figure 2) may help show more ways in which this
distinction between duress and coercion matters, as well as how the
proposed test predicts the results (if not the reasoning) of cases in the338
area. To keep the situations plausible, it is best to change the facts. "A,
a large university food service, has purchased all of its produce from B, a
337. See Richard A. Epstein, Unconsionability: A Critical Reappraisal, 18 J.L. &
ECON. 293, 295-96 (1975); Ian R. Macneil, Efficient Breach of Contract: Circles in the Sky,
68 VA. L. REv. 947, 966-67 (1982).
338. See e.g., Roth Steel Prods. v. Sharon Steel Corp., 705 F.2d 134, 148 (6th Cir.
1983); Business Incentives Co., Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 397 F. Supp 63, 69 (S.D.N.Y.
1975).
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Cutoff
No duress; B is bound.
New Contract 1 - .........
Contract
Modification
There is no coercion, but
coercion is not the relevant
test.
There is no duress, but
duress is not the relevant
test.
.. .. ... ..
No coercion; B is bound.
Breach
.1.
No duress; B is bound.
There is coercion, but
coercion is not the
relevant test.
There is no duress, but
duress is not the relevant
test.
There is coercion if B




Different applications of the coercion and duress tests.
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produce wholesaler. A now accounts for fifty percent of B's sales." 339 A
and B have worked under a series of six-month contracts. Suppose four
separate scenarios occur in the fourth month of the current contract, and in
each A makes a statement to which B agrees: (1) "We will not renew your
contract for the next six months unless you cut your prices for the next
contract by twenty percent." When B agrees, a new contract (as opposed to
a modification) is formed, and the duress test applies. A has not made a
threat, much less an improper one, and the duress test is not met. B will be
bound by the contract. (2) "We will not pay you under the current contract,
and you'll have to sue us to get your money unless you cut your prices for
the next contract by twenty percent. ' 34° Again, a new contract is formed
when B agrees. Although A has made a threat as defined by the coercion
test, a court should hold that the threat is not an improper one. Even if it is
an improper threat, B has a reasonable alternative to acceding: B should sue.
The test for duress is not met, although the test for coercion is.
In the next two scenarios a modification rather than a new contract is
presented: (3) "We will not renew your contract unless you cut your prices
for this contract by twenty percent." When B agrees, the current contract is
arguably modified. The coercion test therefore determines whether B is
bound. Because there is no threat to deprive B of a legal right (B has no
right to the contract renewal), B is bound. (4) "We will not pay you under
the current contract, and you'll have to sue us to get your money unless
you'll take twenty percent less than we owe you." There is a threat; A is
proposing to deprive B of a contractual right. It is probably not an improper
threat, and B probably has the reasonable alternative of suing A. There is no
duress, but because there is a threat, B may be able to make out a case of
coercion if agreeing to the cut and then suing for the lacking twenty percent
was reasonable. If B had a pressing need for the money, such a course
would in fact be reasonable, and the coercion test would be met, although
the duress test would not.
One other paradigm case must be addressed: The modification made in
complete good faith despite a "threat" (or perhaps a "warning" or
"prediction") of breach. Take the scenario in which bad weather would
result in a late delivery of wheat. Seller and buyer agree amicably that a
later delivery date is acceptable. Is the modification binding? This question
highlights the importance of the second prong of the coercion test. The first
prong, after all, may well be met: The seller may threaten, however
unwillingly, not to deliver according to the buyer's contractual right.
Although current law might protect the seller because of the unwilling
339. These facts and variations are taken from or suggested by WERTHEIMER, supra
note 329, at 210, and his discussion of Business Incentives, see id. at 215 & n.40
340. See, e.g., Hackley v. Headley, 8 N.W. 511 (Mich. 1881).
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nature of the "threat," that approach is unattractive (for reasons discussed in
the next paragraph). The second prong of the test works better; it requires
the buyer to act reasonably. If the buyer (B) intends to stand on its right to
timely delivery, it should say so rather than simply agreeing to the late
delivery.341 The fundamental question is whether B has acted reasonably in
first assenting to A's proposal and then seeking to have that assent nullified.
It is worth stating explicitly that the coercion test in some ways departs
from the U.C.C. conception. The "legitimate commercial reason" or
"objectively demonstrable reason" tests suggested under the current U.C.C.
regime342 or by some commentators 343 is different; they concentrate on the
motivation of the party seeking the modification. Such factors could be
relevant to whether the modification was coerced,344 but they would not be
dispositive. A party who suffers a cost increase has a strong incentive to
modify the contract, and this change external to the contract gives a
powerful incentive to seek a change to the contract itself. A manufacturer
who suffers skyrocketing costs of raw materials would want to change the
price of its manufactured goods, and it would have a legitimate commercial
reason for seeking a modification of any fixed-price contract. The buyer,
however, may resist, as is its right. That was the whole point of the fixed-
price contract: to shift such risks to the seller. If the seller then extorts a
modification through behavior that does not amount to duress, but which
results in coercion-as through a holdup, and as happened in Roth
Steel345 -the modification should not be enforced. 346 This focus is more
congruent with the basis for contractual liability, which centers on the assent
of the party being charged.347
341. See United States ex rel. Crane Co. v. Progressive Enters., Inc., 418 F. Supp.
662, 664 (E.D. Va. 1976) (stating that if buyer wanted to insist on pre-modification price, it
should have said so).
342. See U.C.C. § 2-209 cmt. 2 (1999).
343. See Johnston, supra note 57, at 374-75.
344. For example, when A makes a "threat" unwillingly, it may be open to finding
an accommodation for B or even to perform as required if B makes clear its insistence on the
contract. In such situations, B does not act reasonably by agreeing to the modification, and
the second prong of the coercion test is not satisfied.
345. 705 F.2d 134, 148 (6th Cir. 1983).
346. See Selmer Co. v. Blakeslee-Midwest Co., 704 F.2d 924, 927 (7th Cir. 1983);
Wisconsin Knife Works v. National Metal Crafters, 781 F.2d 1280, 1285 (7th Cir. 1986).
347. An analogy to the defense of misrepresentation buttresses this point. Although
fraudulent intent may be relevant to a tort action for deceit, a perfectly innocent
misrepresentation gives rise to a contractual defense. So far as the misled party is concerned,
the motivations of the other party matter little. What matters is that the consenting party was
misled. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§162(2), 164(1) (1981);
RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS §§ 470,476 (1932). For a collection of other relevant cases,
see Halpert v. Rosenthal, 267 A.2d 730 (R.I. 1970).
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The chief benefit of the coercion standard is that it already underlies
judicial decision-making in this context. As explained at the outset, one of
the primary reasons for making a contract is to prevent change. The
courts-and contract law-are therefore skeptical of any changes, but are
willing to honor them if they are not coerced. Coercion is what the opinions
speak of already,348 but it is part of some other analysis. Even the
proponents of the duress test cannot avoid the coercion standard.3 49 The
Second Restatement itself uses the coercion standard, even though it is
relegated to comments.
350
The courts should focus on the relevant issue-coercion-as the test
itself, instead of letting it rest in a supporting role behind another inquiry.
The good-faith standard is included in proposed section 1-304A(a) because
of this Author's fundamental wariness of innovation by statute.351 At least
the ineluctably vague reference to good faith should be transparent enough
to invite the courts to apply a more meaningful test. Coercion is that test.
Not only is coercion inconsistent with good faith; coercion is central to
everyone's thinking already. The courts should accept the invitation, both
in cases governed by the U.C.C. and in those governed by the common law.
This Article proposes a simple two-prong test that should be easy to
apply. 352 Given the eagerness with which the courts embraced the criteria
348. See, e.g., United States v. Stump Home Specialties Mfg., 905 F.2d 1117, 1122
(7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J.); Palmer v. Safe Auto Sales, Inc., 452 N.Y.S.2d 995,998 (Civ. Ct.
1982); Roth Steel, 705 F.2d at 148; Angel v. Murray, 322 A.2d 630,636 (R.I. 1974); Alaska
Packers' Ass'n v. Domenico, 117 F. 99, 102 (9th Cir. 1902); see also Wisconsin Knife, 781
F.2d at 1285; Lowey v. Watt, 684 F.2d 957, 969 (D.C. Cir. 1982). The "compulsion"
element in the English law of duress is similar. See Roger Halson, Opportunism, Economic
Duress and Contractual Modifications, 107 L.Q. REv. 649,664-69 (1991).
349. See Hillman, U.C.C., supra note 70, at 375 ("ensure that voluntary
modifications are enforced and that coerced ones are not enforced"); Hillman, Restatement,
supra note 29, at 681 ("fundamental goal of contract modification law is to promote
enforcement of freely-made alterations of existing contractual arrangements and to deny
enforcement of coerced modifications"); cf Hillman, Restatement, supra note 29, at 703
("[d]uress is a superior vehicle for analyzing the voluntariness of a modification").
350. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 89 cmt. b (1981).
351. See, for example, Sir Matthew Hale's warning against the "over-busy" revision
of the law. See J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 243 (3d ed.
1990) (citing I LAW TRACTS 249 (F. Hargrave ed. 1787)). See also Overby, supra note 214,
at 645 (quoting Erasmus' exhortation), as well as Professor Overby's own defense of tradition
in Code drafting, see id. passim.
352. Thankfully two problems that have persisted in the philosophical literature can
be ignored in this context. First, the proposed test does not attempt to gauge the degree of
coercion or the amount of pressure. Measurement would be difficult at best, and it is enough
to say that A coerced B's assent to a degree that can survive dismissal for being de minimis
or immaterial. True, duress requires a greater degree of coercion, but it has its own test. The
law can competently apply legalistic, two-part tests, with each part speaking in terms familiar
to the law (e.g., legal rights, reasonableness). A court need not answer questions like, "How
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in the comments to section 2-209, judges should pick up the coercion test
just as readily.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
The most fundamental purposes of contract law are implicated in the
struggle with change. The whole point of making a contract, and the
primary purpose of contract law, is to tie the parties to their deal. The
classic vinculumjuris, or "legal knot," of centuries of common and civil law
is a metaphorical attempt to capture this conception. Accommodating
change will necessarily prove insusceptible of a simple solution. In the
confusion of competing voices for certainty and flexibility, for freedom of
contract and reliance, each clamors for recognition. These seemingly
irreconcilable concerns have led some to call for drafters who will "swallow
hard and then decide simply" for a rule favoring one interest or another.
353
This Article has taken another approach. Rather than ignore or reject
the competing policies, compromise is required. Choosing one rule or the
other is too likely to lead to wrong results too much of the time. Judges will
resist unfair outcomes, and as hard facts make bad law, confusion would
result. At the same time, benefits would be lost from the alternative
solutions that an all-or-nothing rule would exclude.
The compromise struck here attempts to be as realistic as possible, not
only about contemporary practices, but about the needs of the courts.
Premised on the notion gleaned from case law that coerced changes are the
ones that ought not to be permitted, this Article proposes a straightforward
test of coercion for contract modifications. At the same time, the proposed
legislation permits the parties to lock in their deal more securely with NOM
and NOW clauses, while giving courts a key to the lock in order to protect
reasonable, material, good-faith reliance.
coerced was B?"
Second, I do not undertake to discuss whether a coerced action is voluntary or free.
Some notions of coercion, often labeled "Aristotelian," focus on whether the will of the party
was overborne. Such ideas accord with old-fashioned or Continental will theory in contract
law, but they are less important under the modem objective theory of assent. See generally
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 2 & cmt. b (1981); P.S. Atiyah, Economic Duress
and the "Overborne Will, "98 L.Q. REv. 197 (1982). The importance of the overborne will
persists to a greater degree in criminal law, perhaps, but the concerns there are different. See
generally John Lawrence Hill, A Utilitarian Theory of Duress, 84 IOWA L. REv. 275 (1999),
which includes recent and extensive discussions of the philosophical literature. The test for
coercion that I have offered, which is influenced by the writings of Professors Nozick and
Wertheimer, admittedly raises the issue of voluntariness, see WERTHEIMER, supra note 329,
at 287-90, but I do not believe the larger philosophical question needs to be answered here.
353. Hillman, CISG, supra note 174, at 463.
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This compromise, like all compromises, has costs. But a realistic
regard for the fact situation is a more important constituent of security of
transactions and predictability of decisions, compared to a bright-line rule
that will prove troublesome in the courts. The proposed legislation therefore
rejects a rule that would make NOM and NOW clauses impregnable. The
story of the New York legislation, with a history twice as long as that of the
U.C.C., should teach this lesson. This Article has tried to take into account
not only that lesson, but also the disparate doctrines, and their related
problems, that all revolve around the issue of contractual change. This
explanation, unified under the rubric of change, should encourage
legislatures to adopt the proposed statutory sections. It should also help
persuade the courts to follow not only the statute but also the coercion
standard, both in the realm of the Code and as a matter of common law.
Simpler solutions, while appealing, have only the deceptive attraction of an
illusion.
